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Palestine - semantic skullduggery scuttles sensible solutions : Comments
By David Singer, published 26/6/2012The People of the Book have been linguistically outsmarted by the successors to the authors of the One Thousand and One Nights.
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The Israeli attack on the USS Liberty
This incident was subject to ten official U.S. investigations and three more by Israel. The U.S. government had access to all the relevant information. The indepth investigations and enquiries conclusively established the attack was a tragic mistake.
US Investigations & Reports.
U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry (June 10-18, 1967); CIA Report (June 13, 1967); Clifford Report (July 18, 1967); Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (1967); Senate Armed Services Committee (Feb. 1, 1968); House Appropriations Committee (April-May 1968); House Armed Services Committee (May 10, 1971); Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (1979); National Security Agency (1981); House Armed Services Committee (June 1991).
Joint Chiefs of Staff Fact Finding Team (Russ Report) (June 9-20, 1967), Report of the JCS Fact Finding Team, "USS Liberty Incident, 8 June 1967," The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, June 18, 1967. (extract);
“There were four (4) messages disseminated during the period of 7-8 June 1967 from higher headquarters to subordinate echelons containing revisions to previous instructions regarding the assigned operating location of USS LIBERTY. Since each of these message transmissions contained instructions for substantially increasing the closets point of approach (CPA) to the UAR and Israel, the receipt of any one of these by the USS LIBERTY would undoubtedly have resulted in the ship's being a greater distance from the scene of action than underway between Israel and the UAR. Although the USS LIBERTY was either an action or an information addressee on each of these directives, there is no evidence available to confirm that the ship's Captain received any of them...The failure of the USS LIBERTY to receive any one of these time-critical revisions to operational directives can be attributed to a combination of (1) human error, (2) high volume of communications traffic, and (3) lack of appreciation of sense of urgency regarding the movement of the LIBERTY. (pp. 1-2)” *
cont...