This idea could rid the world of all the ideas about god and the origins of the universe

I briefly mentioned this a few weeks back on another thread just wondering what some of the people on OLO think of this. I find it a very interesting argument and quite possibly very logical.

http://www.simulation-argument.com/faq.html

It looks like an April 1st spoof to me.

Taking the conclusions first, without bothering with the "proof", we find Bostrom stating that:

"(1) The fraction of human-level civilizations that reach a posthuman stage is very close to zero; (2) The fraction of posthuman civilizations that are interested in running ancestor-simulations is very close to zero; (3) The fraction of all people with our kind of experiences that are living in a simulation is very close to one"

And immediately afterwards, averring that:

"it seems sensible to apportion one's credence roughly evenly between (1), (2), and (3)"

If you rely upon two propositions whose likelihood is "very close to zero" in order to produce a third, it makes no sense to give credence equally to each of the three possibilities, or even to accept that the third position deserves to be considered as having a probability "very close to one".

Which is also where the equations in the "proof" fall down. No matter how many times you multiply a number - however astronomically huge - by zero, the answer remains zero.

It may seem like an April fools at first but when you think about it for a while it becomes rather more logical. After all Oxford University Philosophers would not be taking an interest if many people did not think so.


(1) The chances that a species at our current level of development can avoid going extinct before becoming technologically mature is negligibly small

(2) Almost no technologically mature civilisations are interested in running computer simulations of minds like ours

(3) You are almost certainly in a simulation.

Each of these three propositions may be prima facie implausible; yet, if the simulation argument is correct, at least one is true (it does not tell us which).

While the full simulation argument employs some probability theory and formalism, the gist of it can be understood in intuitive terms. Suppose that proposition (1) is false. Then a significant fraction of all species at our level of development eventually becomes technologically mature. Suppose, further, that (2) is false, too. Then some significant fraction of these species that have become technologically mature will use some portion of their computational resources to run computer simulations of minds like ours. But, as we saw earlier, the number of simulated minds that any such technologically mature civilisation could run is astronomically huge.

Therefore, if both (1) and (2) are false, there will be an astronomically huge number of simulated minds like ours. If we work out the numbers, we find that there would be vastly many more such simulated minds than there would be non-simulated minds running on organic brains. In other words, almost all minds like yours, having the kinds of experiences that you have, would be simulated rather than biological. Therefore, by a very weak principle of indifference, you would have to think that you are probably one of these simulated minds rather than one of the exceptional ones that are running on biological neurons.

So if you think that (1) and (2) are both false, you should accept (3). It is not coherent to reject all three propositions. In reality, we do not have much specific information to tell us which of the three propositions might be true. In this situation, it might be reasonable to distribute our credence roughly evenly between the three possibilities, giving each of them a substantial probability.

Let us consider the options in a little more detail. Possibility (1) is relatively straightforward. For example, maybe there is some highly dangerous technology that every sufficiently advanced civilization develops, and which then destroys them. Let us hope that this is not the case.

Possibility (2) requires that there is a strong convergence among all sufficiently advanced civilisations: almost none of them is interested in running computer simulations of minds like ours, and almost none of them contains any relatively wealthy individuals who are interested in doing that and are free to act on their desires. One can imagine various reasons that may lead some civilisations to forgo running simulations, but for (2) to obtain, virtually all civilisations would have to do that. If this were true, it would constitute an interesting constraint on the future evolution of advanced intelligent life.

The third possibility is the philosophically most intriguing. If (3) is correct, you are almost certainly now living in computer simulation that was created by some advanced civilisation. What kind of empirical implications would this have? How should it change the way you live your life?

Your first reaction might think that if (3) is true, then all bets are off, and that one would go crazy if one seriously thought that one was living in a simulation.

Technology is killing us EasyTimes. The more we discover, the more we build and discover, and all the while we pollute and destroy the Creation.
A mature civilisation will look back to what grows and lives and preserve it... at the complete expense of tech advancement. The Bible tells us we are to love it... not dissect it.

I think that this is the part that doesn't work for me, EasyTimes.

>>So if you think that (1) and (2) are both false, you should accept (3). It is not coherent to reject all three propositions. In reality, we do not have much specific information to tell us which of the three propositions might be true<<

If we do not have sufficient information, why is it "coherent" to accept any one of them? The rejection of two propositions does not, and cannot, automatically validate a third.

Explain to me why this isn't congruent with the original:

(1) The chances that a species at our current level of development can avoid going extinct before becoming technologically mature is negligibly small

(2) Almost no technologically mature civilisations have been able to extend human life indefinitely

(3) You will almost certainly live for ever.

Using precisely the same logical constructs, should we be preparing to live on indefinitely, with all the critical decisions about our lives - and others - that this would entail?

While it is certainly not possible to compute exactly the chances of you or I living forever, they must be infinitesimally small. Certainly small enough to have absolutely no impact on the way we live our lives.

Same goes for being in a simulation. We ain't.