This idea could rid the world of all the ideas about god and the origins of the universe

I briefly mentioned this a few weeks back on another thread just wondering what some of the people on OLO think of this. I find it a very interesting argument and quite possibly very logical.

http://www.simulation-argument.com/faq.html

It looks like an April 1st spoof to me.

Taking the conclusions first, without bothering with the "proof", we find Bostrom stating that:

"(1) The fraction of human-level civilizations that reach a posthuman stage is very close to zero; (2) The fraction of posthuman civilizations that are interested in running ancestor-simulations is very close to zero; (3) The fraction of all people with our kind of experiences that are living in a simulation is very close to one"

And immediately afterwards, averring that:

"it seems sensible to apportion one's credence roughly evenly between (1), (2), and (3)"

If you rely upon two propositions whose likelihood is "very close to zero" in order to produce a third, it makes no sense to give credence equally to each of the three possibilities, or even to accept that the third position deserves to be considered as having a probability "very close to one".

Which is also where the equations in the "proof" fall down. No matter how many times you multiply a number - however astronomically huge - by zero, the answer remains zero.

It may seem like an April fools at first but when you think about it for a while it becomes rather more logical. After all Oxford University Philosophers would not be taking an interest if many people did not think so.


(1) The chances that a species at our current level of development can avoid going extinct before becoming technologically mature is negligibly small

(2) Almost no technologically mature civilisations are interested in running computer simulations of minds like ours

(3) You are almost certainly in a simulation.

Each of these three propositions may be prima facie implausible; yet, if the simulation argument is correct, at least one is true (it does not tell us which).

While the full simulation argument employs some probability theory and formalism, the gist of it can be understood in intuitive terms. Suppose that proposition (1) is false. Then a significant fraction of all species at our level of development eventually becomes technologically mature. Suppose, further, that (2) is false, too. Then some significant fraction of these species that have become technologically mature will use some portion of their computational resources to run computer simulations of minds like ours. But, as we saw earlier, the number of simulated minds that any such technologically mature civilisation could run is astronomically huge.

Therefore, if both (1) and (2) are false, there will be an astronomically huge number of simulated minds like ours. If we work out the numbers, we find that there would be vastly many more such simulated minds than there would be non-simulated minds running on organic brains. In other words, almost all minds like yours, having the kinds of experiences that you have, would be simulated rather than biological. Therefore, by a very weak principle of indifference, you would have to think that you are probably one of these simulated minds rather than one of the exceptional ones that are running on biological neurons.

So if you think that (1) and (2) are both false, you should accept (3). It is not coherent to reject all three propositions. In reality, we do not have much specific information to tell us which of the three propositions might be true. In this situation, it might be reasonable to distribute our credence roughly evenly between the three possibilities, giving each of them a substantial probability.

Let us consider the options in a little more detail. Possibility (1) is relatively straightforward. For example, maybe there is some highly dangerous technology that every sufficiently advanced civilization develops, and which then destroys them. Let us hope that this is not the case.

Possibility (2) requires that there is a strong convergence among all sufficiently advanced civilisations: almost none of them is interested in running computer simulations of minds like ours, and almost none of them contains any relatively wealthy individuals who are interested in doing that and are free to act on their desires. One can imagine various reasons that may lead some civilisations to forgo running simulations, but for (2) to obtain, virtually all civilisations would have to do that. If this were true, it would constitute an interesting constraint on the future evolution of advanced intelligent life.

The third possibility is the philosophically most intriguing. If (3) is correct, you are almost certainly now living in computer simulation that was created by some advanced civilisation. What kind of empirical implications would this have? How should it change the way you live your life?

Your first reaction might think that if (3) is true, then all bets are off, and that one would go crazy if one seriously thought that one was living in a simulation.

Technology is killing us EasyTimes. The more we discover, the more we build and discover, and all the while we pollute and destroy the Creation.
A mature civilisation will look back to what grows and lives and preserve it... at the complete expense of tech advancement. The Bible tells us we are to love it... not dissect it.

I think that this is the part that doesn't work for me, EasyTimes.

>>So if you think that (1) and (2) are both false, you should accept (3). It is not coherent to reject all three propositions. In reality, we do not have much specific information to tell us which of the three propositions might be true<<

If we do not have sufficient information, why is it "coherent" to accept any one of them? The rejection of two propositions does not, and cannot, automatically validate a third.

Explain to me why this isn't congruent with the original:

(1) The chances that a species at our current level of development can avoid going extinct before becoming technologically mature is negligibly small

(2) Almost no technologically mature civilisations have been able to extend human life indefinitely

(3) You will almost certainly live for ever.

Using precisely the same logical constructs, should we be preparing to live on indefinitely, with all the critical decisions about our lives - and others - that this would entail?

While it is certainly not possible to compute exactly the chances of you or I living forever, they must be infinitesimally small. Certainly small enough to have absolutely no impact on the way we live our lives.

Same goes for being in a simulation. We ain't.

As you point out Pericles it is all speculation but its coherent to say that one of the three must be true. If not please insert a forth option of your choice which will make the argument more cohesive.

“(2) Almost no technologically mature civilisations have been able to extend human life indefinitely” With current genetics I cant see why in a few hundred years humans wont for all practical purposes live forever - http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/08/10/1060454075552.html

“(3) You will almost certainly live for ever.” I don’t believe this one the correct third option is “You are almost certainly living in a simulator. “

I should also add how many people today would be interested in going back and living at the time of the Romans or Capitan Cook to see what life was like then? I think it would be rather interesting and it would give you a whole new perspective on life.

And Just remember it does not have to be humans who build these machines it could be any civilisation in the universe who does.

All it takes is one of these machines which puts us at a 50% chance of us living in one. If there are 2 of them well that makes it a 67% chance that we live in one. If there are 1000’s of them well I guess that makes it about 99.9999% chance that we live in a simulated universe. A humbling thought

While the idea that there is some kind of proof is ludicrous (the non-existence of God appears to be an assumption behind the proof, not something that is proven), the 'theory' that we are in a simulation has been around for a while:

http://www.ozpolitic.com/forum/YaBB.pl?num=1187644798/7#7

Sorry, EasyTimes, but I think the answer is that you have to be an Oxford philosopher to actually kick around this particular football.

The rules of logic that apply to philosophers are far less rigid than those we tend to employ in our daily lives. While it may be true statistically that we are in fact just a player in someone else's computer game, it is only via the use of "extreme statistics", i.e. when you can multiply a number that is only notionally "not-zero" and arrive at a world where the product of those two numbers approaches infinity.

This is little more than post-grad games. And I strongly take issue with your statement "Oxford University Philosophers would not be taking an interest if many people did not think so" That should read "Oxford University Philosophers would not be taking an interest if other [Name] University Philosophers did not think so."

The objective of philosophy is to allow us to ponder on the human condition. Asking ourselves "what would you do differently if you realized you were only a simulation" is hardly going to advance that thinking more than a millimeter or two.

Pericles we are not asking what we would do differently if we all thought we lived in a simulator just whether or not it is a possibility!

I doubt we will ever be able to prove much but I think we can try to narrow things down and I think the simulator argument is the best theory of everything I have heard. Although perplexing it is the closest we have come so far and is quite logically a very real possibility.

Speculations as to what computers might one day be capable of are commonplace, but Frank Tipler takes things a good deal further than most. Tipler argues that if our descendants develop computers as far as they can be developed, given known physical constraints, we can all look forward to being resurrected in the far-future. Intriguingly, he suggests that our resurrection will not depend on our descendants having detailed knowledge of what our lives were actually like. The deduction runs thus:

(1) The computational conception of the mind is true. Any mental life, any stream of consciousness, can be replicated on a suitably programmed computer.

(2) There total number of possible human-like streams of consciousness (of finite duration) is finite.

(3) The processing power of the ‘universal computer’ that our descendants will develop will be effectively infinite.

(4) The universal computer will easily be able to simulate every possible human stream of consciousness (of finite length
In fact, Tipler goes further. It is not just minds that will be simulated: ‘an emulation of all possible variants of our world – the so-called visible universe – would require at most 10 to the 10 to the 123 bits of computer capacity … this amount of computer capacity will be available in the far future.’

(5) Hence our resurrection is all but inevitable: ‘The dead will be resurrected when the computer capacity of the universe is so large that the amount of capacity required to store all possible human simulations is an insignificant fraction of the entire capacity.’

What a lot of guff. Who invents this rubbish? Must be people with no grasp of reality. Is this is what happens when they spend too much time in 'cyberspace'?

If I was a simulation, I'd be due an upgrade by now.

EasyTimes, I am not so sure just "being a possibility" is enough.

>>Pericles we are not asking what we would do differently if we all thought we lived in a simulator just whether or not it is a possibility!<<

While browsing the various commentaries on Bostrom's work, one of the more interesting themes I found was one that pursued the argument "so, if we know we are in a simulation, should we behave differently, and if so, how?"

The discussion quickly became bogged down in the usual issues with predestination and free will, but it was good while it lasted.

In my view, the only valid use of philosophy is to generate responses to such questions - asking them for the sake of asking them does seem to me to be the height of self-indulgence.

The same goes for the "resurrection via computer" meme.

Whether or not it is a load of old blether - which in my opinion it is, because it has to park a lot of unknowns on the way to its conclusion - it ought to generate discussion on the meaning, intent and desirability of such "resurrection".

For me, it immediately raises the questions of distinction between the concepts of soul and personality versus being and thinking. Whereas it is possible to postulate that sufficient computing power will exist to re-create "every possible human stream of consciousness", it is difficult to envisage the "why" that accompanies it.

Just because it is possible, doesn't mean it has to be done.

But an interesting digression nevertheless.

Why is the easy part Pericles. It’s a simple human longing to be with your loved ones. Who would not want to resurrect a loved one who had died? Even if it was not real it could go a long way towards the healing process and the sense of loss you feel when someone has died.

Should we act differently – Well even if we could prove that we lived in a simulator this is still our “life” and our experience and the only thing that would need adjusting would be religion.

Tipler goes further. It is not just minds that will be simulated: ‘an emulation of all possible variants of our world – the so-called visible universe – would require at most 10 to the 10 to the 123 bits of computer capacity … this amount of computer capacity will be available in the far future.’
The Simulation Argument goes some way towards providing a solution to the traditional Problem of Evil. The problem is not ‘How could an omnipotent and benevolent God create a universe where bad things happen to some people’ – given free will, some people will, on occasion, choose to act in ways which result in other people suffering. The problem is rather this: ‘How could an omnipotent and benevolent God create a universe where there’s so much pointless suffering, suffering that results from natural causes, rather than the actions of free agents.’ But if your current life is a virtual life, then it could well be that the universe as a whole has (proportionally) a lot less pointless suffering than your virtual universe. Perhaps the unpleasantness to be found in the latter is due to the free choices made by some future (not very moral) human – the person who set up the parameters of the virtual world you inhabit – hence God is not directly responsible for the unpleasantness in question. The Simulation Argument thus provides an unexpected boost to the Free Will solution to the Problem of Evil.

Riveting stuff!
I am intrigued by the ‘all possible variants of the world’ prospect:

i) During an individuals passage through life they would in every moment, be faced with a myriad of alternatives (trivial or profound). If every thing not done/not chosen represents a path to a possible world, forgone , and if you factor-in all the non-human bits of the worlds & their foregone worlds, there must be a H–U–G–E number of possible worlds–surely , too many for a finite universe to contain(?)

ii) It also seems to me , if you do create all possible worlds you face a second problem–the world we’ve experienced up-till-now at least ,is not static. Do the resurrected inhabitants merely replicate their previous lives–or do they live some other scenario. And, if they live some other scenario, would they be the same individuals, since like river we flow & change on our experiences. Wouldn’t you need to preserve the smallest unit of perception ( like a snap shot), of every world.?

iii) In all possible worlds there would be some, where your loved ones would suffer horribly. Would it be ‘moral’ to create such worlds –or, if yours experience agonies & mine ecstasies , what do we do?