Dear John,

«At this point, I don't think we disagree about facts so much as about what kinds of explanations are allowed to count.»

If so then we do not need to go on, but I am not quite sure what facts exactly you wish to explain?

The facts of climate science - I am not even going into it.

The facts about people's present attitudes towards climate and climate science?

If this is what you meant, then as we agree on the facts as you say, we can agree on the fact that MOST people today treat the topic of "climate-change" as political and are therefore not genuinely interested in climate-science (except as a political tool, so long as it supports their political views). Thus most people's attitude towards "mitigation" follows their political persuasion, so most of both those who support or oppose "mitigation", even while claiming otherwise, are in fact, first and foremost, seeking solidarity with their camp rather than some physical and/or economical outcome.

Is that agreed?

Around 1990 that was different.
At the time, myself and nearly everyone naively believed that climate means climate and science means science.

Yuyutsu,

I don't think that formulation can be agreed to as stated, and the reason matters.

Yes, public discourse around climate is heavily politicised.
Yes, many people express views in ways that signal group identity.
Yes, science is often used rhetorically in public debate.

None of that is in dispute.

What doesn't follow is the claim that most people are therefore not genuinely evidence-responsive, or that science functions merely as a political tool rather than as a causal input into belief formation.

Those are stronger claims, and they require more than observation of politicisation to sustain.

People routinely form beliefs under mixed conditions:

- evidence filtered through trust,
- identity pressures,
- institutional credibility,
- ethical weighting,
- and practical constraints.

That mixture does not reduce to "politics first, evidence irrelevant". It describes how evidence actually operates in social contexts.

As for 1990, I don't think the difference was epistemic purity. It was salience. The issue was less identity-laden, less polarised, and less entangled with immediate costs. That changes behaviour, not the underlying relationship between evidence and belief.

So no, I don't agree that "most people" are uninterested in climate science except as a political weapon. I agree that many people engage with it through political lenses. That's a very different claim.

And that distinction is precisely what we've been circling throughout.

Dear John,

Here is a subtle difference:

You began by stating what we already agree regarding discourse, views and rhetoric.

Well and good, but then you turned to speak about beliefs:

«People routinely form beliefs under mixed conditions:»

We could indeed get into analysing, as you just did, how beliefs are formed, but I don't think that would be necessary here, due to the subtle difference between discourse, views and rhetoric on the one hand, and beliefs on the other.

NORMALLY indeed, beliefs determine discourse, views and rhetoric.
NORMALLY, as an analogy, chemical properties determine the arrangement of atoms into molecules.

But,

When the temperature rises sufficiently, matter turns into the state of plasma, where chemistry no longer counts and molecules are not formed.

Similarly, when the socio-political temperature gets as high as in this super-charged "climate change" debate, when stakes are so high, beliefs no longer count in discourse, views and rhetoric: they are bypassed!

Understanding this, personally, I consciously avoid holding any beliefs regarding climate/climate-science, as they won't matter anyway.
Others who do not understand this, may form beliefs this way or the other, only to bypass them when entering a debate on the topic (including even just with themselves), so why even waste their time?

In 1990, of course, the situation was "normal", the socio-political pressures were at room-temperature, so then beliefs still mattered, and evidence mattered accordingly, as an important ingredient.
At the time, discourse, views and rhetoric were primarily determined by beliefs - not so today.

Thanks for that, Yuyutsu. You've confirmed the structure I was pointing to.

What you're now describing is not a dispute about how beliefs are formed, but a position in which beliefs are declared irrelevant under conditions of political salience.

Once that move is made, the rest follows automatically.

If beliefs are said to be "bypassed" rather than distorted, constrained, or mediated, then no amount of evidence can ever count as explanatory. Discourse becomes self-contained, and all observable behaviour is treated as epiphenomenal to politics.

That isn't an empirical finding. It's a stipulation about what kinds of explanations are permitted.

Your plasma analogy illustrates this well, but not in the way you intend. In physics, phase transitions are identified by independent, testable mechanisms. Here, the "transition" consists of declaring belief irrelevant by definition, not demonstrating its absence or causal impotence.

So when you say you consciously avoid holding beliefs about climate because they "won't matter anyway", that isn't neutrality toward science. It's resignation from epistemic engagement under precisely the conditions where it matters most.

That position is coherent, but it's also exactly what I've been describing throughout.

At that point, we're no longer disagreeing about climate, psychology, or sociology. We're disagreeing about whether belief and evidence are allowed, even in principle, to do explanatory work in contested domains.

Dear John,

Well surely there comes a point where belief and evidence have to be suspended: suppose someone was running and trying to take shelter from the bullets in Bondi beach while someone else tapped on their shoulder, "hey, wait a minute, I need to ask you which Hanukkah song you like better?"...

I believe that this point has been reached in the particular case of "climate-change", while you seem to believe that it has not.

Yes, in physics, phase transitions are identified by independent, testable mechanisms and here too I suggested such a test:

Normally, 99.9% of people consistently care for their environment and would be happy to hear when climate improves and sad to hear when it worsens.

Not so past the phase transition.

A careful psychological experiment for testing this, albeit difficult and likely complicated with ethical issues, is theoretically possible to design and should likely also be possible in practice if sufficiently desired.

If the result of this experiment shows that we haven't crossed that phase transition, then it may still be meaningful to discuss earth's climate.
Otherwise, we better instead directly discuss and negotiate the socio-political climate we want to live in.

Yuyutsu,

Your reply doesn't advance the analysis, it restates the same boundary condition more explicitly.

Your Bondi Beach analogy conflates situational urgency with epistemic suspension. Running from bullets temporarily suspends deliberation because action is time-critical, not because belief and evidence have ceased to matter. The beliefs about what bullets are, where danger lies, and how shelter works are doing all the causal work in that moment.

Climate change is not analogous. It is a long-horizon, cumulative phenomenon whose only tractable responses depend on evidence-guided belief formation and coordination over time. Declaring belief "suspended" here is not a response to urgency; it is a refusal of epistemic engagement.

The same applies to your proposed "phase transition" test. You continue to define the transition in terms of inferred emotional states while treating behavioural and attitudinal evidence as politically contaminated by default. That doesn't establish a mechanism. It stipulates an exclusion.

So when you say that if the transition has occurred, we should abandon discussion of the physical climate and negotiate social arrangements instead, you're no longer describing what people do. You're prescribing what should be treated as legitimate to discuss.

That is a coherent philosophical position. But it is not an empirical finding, and it is not neutral with respect to evidence.

At this point, the disagreement is no longer about psychology or climate. It is about whether contested domains justify suspending belief and evidence rather than working harder to discipline them.

We differ there, and that difference is now fully explicit.