Thank you for such a candid response, Yuyutsu.

//So to prevent a long and unmanageable spaghetti, here we have 3 completely separate topics.//

I’m happy to accept that separation for the sake of clarity.

//There exists natural science alright.//

Agreed.

//But besides, there also exists a socio-political phenomenon of shouting "climate change" from the rooftops.//

This is where your position is now unambiguous. You are no longer describing how people sometimes behave around science - you are asserting that the dominant climate discourse is primarily a political movement, and that engagement with evidence is merely one of its tactics.

At that point, the role of evidence has already been decided in advance.

//The view that this socio-political issue should be dealt with using scientific tools, is a one-sided tactic.//

That is precisely the stance I've been describing throughout. Once scientific engagement is framed as a battlefield to be avoided rather than a means of adjudication, belief is no longer responsive to evidence in principle.

That isn't neutrality. It's a prior commitment.

//No reasonable general would take that bait!//

That metaphor is telling. It confirms that what's being rejected here isn't flawed evidence, but the very idea that evidence should be decisive at all.

At that point, we're no longer discussing climate science or even public communication. We're discussing an ideological posture in which evidence is subordinated to perceived power struggles.

That may be a sincerely held worldview. But once adopted, it resolves the question we've been circling.

The stance is not one of detachment, scepticism, or neutrality. It is one in which belief is insulated by design.

And that's the distinction I've been drawing throughout.

Dear John,

«you are asserting that the dominant climate discourse is primarily a political movement, and that engagement with evidence is merely one of its tactics.»

Perfectly put. You seem to be better with words than myself!

«At that point, we're no longer discussing climate science or even public communication. We're discussing an ideological posture in which evidence is subordinated to perceived power struggles.»

Yes again, I enjoy your succinct language and let me take it a step further:

Suppose, let us imagine, that a rare new species of moss (or moth perhaps, whichever) is discovered which devours atmospheric carbon dioxide at a rate faster than anything seen before, so it is cultivated and within a month, atmospheric CO2 drops to pre-industrial levels.

The "climate-change" people would then be wearing Sackcloth and ashes because their thoughts were never truly related to our environment.

I suspect this does work than you intend, Yuyutsu:

//Suppose… atmospheric CO2 drops to pre-industrial levels… The "climate-change" people would then be wearing sackcloth and ashes…//

Your hypothetical isn't a test of motives, it's a declaration of unfalsifiability.

You've constructed a scenario in which no empirical outcome could ever count as evidence that concern about climate was sincere or evidence-responsive. If CO2 rises, the concern is hysteria; if CO2 falls, the concern is exposed as pretext. Either way, the conclusion is fixed in advance.

That's not scepticism. It's more confirmation by design.

More importantly, the hypothetical quietly concedes the very thing you claim is irrelevant: that atmospheric CO2 levels do matter physically. Your imagined solution targets CO2 precisely because it is causally linked to climate. The fact that a technological fix would change the policy landscape wouldn't reveal bad faith, it would simply demonstrate responsiveness to evidence.

And that's the distinction that keeps resurfacing.

- A stance that allows evidence to resolve a problem is epistemic.
- A stance that pre-judges every possible resolution as proof of ulterior motive is ideological.

Once again, that's not a moral criticism. My point is that the latter is no longer neutral or detached, nor is it open to revision.

And that's something I think we both understand.

Dear John,

«Your hypothetical isn't a test of motives, it's a declaration of unfalsifiability.»

Unfalsifiability of what?

Not of climate-science - because nothing stops the scientists in their ivory towers from doing good research.

Or did you mean of the social phenomenon?

I suppose one could design an experiment (it may not be ethical, but): lock up a sample of climate-change-supporting criminal prisoners in a designated prison wing with limited access to true world news, alongside a non-climate-change-supporting control group in another wing, then tell them the [false] story about that moss/moth and secretly monitor whether they are smiling or crying.

«More importantly, the hypothetical quietly concedes the very thing you claim is irrelevant»

In my hypothetical case, CO2 levels drop.
I made no assertion as to whether and how climate responds: either way, whether climate responds or otherwise, what is relevant is that climate-change-people, who presumably had all their Christmases come true, can no longer ask others to identify with them by reducing carbon emissions.

«And that's something I think we both understand.»

We do. I think we always did.

Yuyutsu,

I'm referring to the "unfalsifiability" of the claim you are making about the climate discourse itself.

//Unfalsifiability of what?//

Not climate science. Not physical mechanisms. But your assertion that concern about climate is, in essence, a pretext for political identity and power.

Your hypothetical is structured so that no conceivable outcome could ever count against that claim.

//Not of climate-science - because nothing stops the scientists in their ivory towers from doing good research.//

Agreed. That’s precisely why unfalsifiability does not apply to climate science here. It applies to the social diagnosis you’re advancing about motives and movements.

//Or did you mean of the social phenomenon?//

Yes. Exactly that.

You’ve constructed a frame in which:

- concern about rising CO2 proves hysteria, and
- resolution of CO2 proves ulterior motive.

In neither case is there a possible observation that would allow you to say, "I was wrong about what’s driving this."

That’s what unfalsifiability means.

//In my hypothetical case, CO2 levels drop… what is relevant is that climate-change-people… can no longer ask others to identify with them.//

That sentence does the work for me.

You’re no longer evaluating claims about climate or evidence. You’re evaluating who gets to make demands, mobilise norms, or shape identity. The physical outcome is secondary to the social consequence.

That’s a coherent political worldview, but it confirms that evidence is not playing an adjudicative role.

//We do. I think we always did.//

Perhaps. But earlier you described this as neutrality, detachment, and disinterest in science. What you’ve now articulated is a settled ideological stance about power, identity, and persuasion.

That’s not a criticism. But it resolves the question we started with.

The issue was never whether climate science exists. It was whether evidence is allowed, in principle, to revise belief.

On your own account, it isn’t.

And with that made explicit, there’s really nothing left to untangle.

Dear John,

Regarding this unfalsifiability:

It is indeed difficult to falsify, but not entirely impossible, not in theory at least.

To verify or refute my claim, it seems that we would need either mind-reading skills, or manipulative misinformation - both unethical, but perhaps you could come up with a third method that I haven't considered, who knows?

Essentially we have 3 groups of people:
1) C-MOB, propagating the idea of "climate change" on socio-political grounds.
2) R-MOB, rubbishing the idea of "climate change" on socio-political grounds.
3) S-MOB, asking "what does climate-science say?".

My claim is that:
|S-MOB| << min(|C-MOB|,|R-MOB|)

Now here are 4 possible scenarios and how people would feel about them:

1) People/states make great effort to reduce carbon-emissions and the climate improves:

C-MOB: very happy
R-MOB: very sad
S-MOB: happy

2) People/states make great effort, but climate does not improve:

C-MOB: happy but concerned
R-MOB: sad but hopeful
S-MOB: sad

3) People/states stop efforts, but climate improves:

C-MOB: very sad
R-MOB: very happy
S-MOB: happy

4) People/states stop efforts and climate does not improve:

C-MOB: sad but hopeful
R-MOB: happy but concerned
S-MOB: sad

So, if some experiment could convince people (unethically, by lying to them) that scenario #3 has occurred and monitored their reaction covertly, then this should easily prove or refute that |S-MOB| << |C-MOB|.
Similarly if an experiment could convince people that scenario #1 has occurred, then this should easily prove or refute that |S-MOB| << |R-MOB|.