Yuyutsu,

I’m trying to picture what you mean by something being less humane but more morally acceptable.

From what you’ve said, perhaps you mean something like jail time for repeat seatbelt offenders? If so, that seems like a poor example because jail is both less humane and more coercive than a fine, tax, or premium adjustment.

Could you give a concrete example? Because in every case I think of - seatbelts, medical aid, smoking risks, etc. - the less humane option (withholding help or letting harm occur) seems morally worse, not better.

I’m open to being shown otherwise, but right now it feels like moral acceptability and humaneness naturally point in the same direction.

No rush. Whenever you've got the time.

Dear John,

«From what you’ve said, perhaps you mean something like jail time for repeat seatbelt offenders?»

That was an example of IMMORALITY.
Jailing people for not wearing a seatbelt is both immoral and inhumane.

«I’m open to being shown otherwise, but right now it feels like moral acceptability and humaneness naturally point in the same direction.»

Moral acceptability and humaneness often point in the same direction - but not always.

A good example for the difference between humaneness and morality is the Trolley Problem: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem

In the most basic form of that dilemma, a humane person would flip the switch, thus diverting the trolley and killing just one instead of five people, while a moral person would not touch the switch.

One way to point at the difference, is that morality focuses on the righteousness of actions
(which actions are within one's duty to perform and which actions are within one's duty to avoid),
while humaneness focuses on the likely results of the actions and whether they be favourable to humankind or otherwise.

Yuyutsu,

I’m glad we agree moral acceptability and humaneness usually align.

The trolley problem is interesting, but ethicists haven’t settled on inaction being “more moral,” and public policy rarely resembles that scenario.

Choosing not to regulate risk isn’t neutral. It predictably causes harm.

That’s why measures like seatbelt laws and smoking taxes end up both humane and morally justified: they prevent suffering without forcing anyone into trolley-style choices.

Dear John,

No wonder ethicists have not settled their views - some are primarily moralists while others are primarily result-oriented pragmatist humanists.

«public policy rarely resembles that scenario»

Well of course, I just wanted to provide a pure and sharp example: real-life situations are usually more blurred, but the question is still along the lines of making some people suffer for the perceived benefit of others in the name of "the greater good".

Humanists have a goal (unachievable in my view) of reducing the sum of overall suffering, regardless of its causes.
Moralists consider the source of suffering important, saying, "come what may, I will not allow my actions to become the cause of new suffering to others".

«Choosing not to regulate risk isn’t neutral. It predictably causes harm.»

That harm comes from cars and trucks in motion, not from under-regulation.

Even if regulation could prevent a harm (not that it really does), it is not its cause when it doesn't. From a metaphysical point of view, the real cause of any harm are the previous actions of the "victim", whether they still consciously remember these actions or otherwise, thus even if regulation prevents a specific accident from happening, some different accident would happen to replace it (and not necessarily a road accident).

Yet besides the original harms it seeks to reduce, enforceable regulation creates a new and different harm, that of causing people to live in fear of the police and robbing away their sense of agency and responsibility (including their pride and satisfaction in choosing to wear their seatbelts voluntarily). People who feel humiliated and helpless by the law could instead express their frustration at others: possibly at other drivers, cyclists or pedestrians, or it could be at domestic partners, children, co-workers, etc. Government could count and be proud of the number of directly reduced road-fatalities and injuries, while not taking into account the indirect consequences.

The end result of causing harm, even if it's a naive well-meaning harm, cannot be good. Anything short of self-defence is inexcusable, and even self-defence cannot really prevent harm, only postpone it.

Yuyutsu,

I see where you’re coming from, but this feels like it’s drifting pretty far from practical ethics.

Earlier, you agreed that moral acceptability and humaneness usually line up, and you even said you’re fine with higher premiums or taxing risk-takers – which are both forms of regulation. Now you’re saying “anything short of self-defence is inexcusable,” which sounds like a complete rejection of collective risk management. That’s a big shift.

The idea that accidents are inevitable and regulation just “shifts harm elsewhere” doesn’t fit with what we actually see. Seatbelt laws, smoking restrictions, and other safety rules have saved thousands of lives without creating equal or greater harm somewhere else.

Metaphysically, you might believe every injury is fated, but policymaking can’t operate on cosmic determinism. It has to deal with observable outcomes – and those outcomes show proportionate regulation prevents suffering without producing the indirect harms you’ve described.

Would you agree that ethics guiding public policy needs to be grounded in real-world evidence, not just metaphysical theory?

Dear John,

«Earlier, you agreed that moral acceptability and humaneness usually line up»

They do, but what has coercion to do with either?

If you can come up with humane policies which do not involve coercion (or other forms of violence), then I'll support them.

«and you even said you’re fine with higher premiums or taxing risk-takers»

I'm more than fine with higher premiums (as insurance is not compulsory), but as for tax, I said it is a vast grey area, which we haven't yet started discussing.

«Now you’re saying “anything short of self-defence is inexcusable,»

Nothing short of self-defence can excuse coercion.

«The idea that accidents are inevitable and regulation just “shifts harm elsewhere” doesn’t fit with what we actually see.»

Perfect observation: we cannot see this.
This phenomenon is called "Adrishta": "unseen"/"invisible".
- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2pGzwRZHdQY

«Seatbelt laws, smoking restrictions, and other safety rules have saved thousands of lives without creating equal or greater harm somewhere else.»

The effects of the laws in themselves are indeed positive.
But there're also the effects of the enforcement regime of these laws, which are negative.

«Metaphysically, you might believe every injury is fated»

More precisely, some injury or suffering of similar nature and magnitude is inevitable, not this or that particular injury.

«but policymaking can’t operate on cosmic determinism. It has to deal with observable outcomes»

Well it could also include the observations of the ancient sages, made with their "spiritual eyes" rather than with their physical eyes, even if this rarely occurs in our day and age.

«and those outcomes show proportionate regulation prevents suffering without producing the indirect harms you’ve described.»

Well, I can recount exactly how I personally suffered indirectly as a result of a similar law (and if need be, I'll spend another 350-word block to do so).

«Would you agree that ethics guiding public policy needs to be grounded in real-world evidence, not just metaphysical theory?»

Metaphysics point at aspects of reality no less real than what our normal five senses can perceive. Would you like it if policies relied, for example, only on the sense of smell?