in a parliamentary society, tax codes are often complex, and economists commonly claim that they inhibit or distort activity away from productive paths. ross gittins , writing in the smh, has made a career out of reporting the economic crimes of parliament. his position is secure because parliament can't change. economic 'crime' is built in:

two parties, "a" and "b" contend for election, "a" wins by 51% to 49% of the vote.

"b" commences to think. they identify a group that voted for "a" at least large enough to change the result, perhaps only 1% of the electorate . "b" offers this group a special favor. it might be a tax benefit, or support for private schools. the group changes it's voting habit, "b" wins the next election. all tax payers must pay a little more, to support this special perk. so "a" commences to think along similar lines, etc.

the inevitable result is a tangled tax code, a hobbled economy, and a community divided by well-founded suspicion that others are getting better treatment.

in an actual democracy, taxes have to assented to directly by half plus one of the entire electorate, special favors can't be hidden. better yet, administrators don't have financial favors to give. instead, they must hold their jobs with efficient service, good planning and probity.

This is an interesting idea... does it work in reverse? If a government decides a group isn't going to give them enough votes, do they then remove the tax perk?
Is there any likelihood, do you think, of religions ever paying any tax on the approximately twenty billion dollars of unaudited profits they make each year, for which they are completely unaccountable?