'Tom Beauchamp and James Childress have developed an ethical thinking process
1. respect for the autonomy of others; how about the 12 year old girl?
2. nonmaleficence (do no harm); child porn doing no harm?
3. beneficence (prevent the occasion for harm); and
4. ensure justice (fair treatment for all). Who decides what is fair?

Another of today’s philosophers, William Frankena, came up with a not too-dissimilar list,
1. not inflict evil or harm; child porn does harm?
2. prevent evil or harm; encourage child exploitation?
3. remove evil or harm; and finally
4. promote good. (showing 12 year olds vaginas and breast does not promote good.

Even by these philosophers own clumsy ethics Henson's pornography fails dismally. So many so bound by their own lusts that they defend this perverted man's pornography. We are a sick society in denial of any decent ethics.

I don't think art-libertarian respondents have been fair to Peter Bowden's disciplined and lucid article. Lev's was probably the most focused and coherent, but it too was unfair in not treating the article on its own terms (acknowledged by Lev) i.e., as "a basic exposition in moral philosophy" relevant to this case. The article's very limited length in OLO obviously prevented Bowden from exploring the philosophical argumentation in enough detail to satisfy Lev's standard here.

The matter of reproduction / redundancy / hyper-production of Henson's photography in the media and online is a relevant concern, but it does not alter substantially from the moral and legal responsibilities in this case. For a loose analogy: if someone made just one large manufacture and export of a dangerously addictive and damaging substance years ago, prosecution for those acts would still be applied even though the product had spread far and wide.

I think the above point contradicts the relativists' jibes about double standards due to Henson's work becoming so accessible and, by implication, material suitable for a wider net of investigation and prosecution. On the one hand, the point actually demolishes Henson backers' protests about a lack of public access to contemplate the works. On the other hand, the fact of such accessibility demonstrates that it is the action and intention that are meant for prohibition and punitive example.

Many photographs display illegal acts or the result of such illegality, but the photographs themselves would only become illegal, impoundable and confiscated where they have been contrived deliberately and directly in a process that is, at some stage, illegal. Such response would be especially applicable to Henson's works, where both public and private exhibition of such photographs involved commercial intent i.e., not in some exceptional "public interest", whistleblowing or dissident context, for example.

mil-observer, sorry but i just don't see it. i read the article again, and i just don't see it. the majority of his article may be disciplined and lucid, but it's simply not relevant. it just doesn't support bowden's conclusions.

there's nothing wrong with setting the framework of "do no harm" and "respect[ing] the autonomy of others". but there's no point in such careful framing if bowden then makes strong and loaded and contentious claims when he gets closer to the actual henson issue.

"Children, in short, are deemed to be incapable of deciding for themselves."

there's nothing "in short" about this. in short, the global statement is absurd.

"Parents who decide for a child on the parents’ preferences are contravening Kant’s second Categorical Imperative".

so, the children are incapable of deciding, and he simply presumes that the parents are deciding for their own preferences? any evidence of this?

"The children are being used."

and so what? does it mean they are not also benefiting, are not also pleased?

the heart of the iss ue is:

"if we were to explore whether Bill Henson’s photographs could cause harm to any of the children, we would come up with a doubtful maybe."

well, argue it. argue the reasons for that harm (is it the photographing itself causing the harm, or the moral outrage of people who disapprove? if the latter, does that matter?). argue why children cannot decide on this issue. compare the risk of harm to the likelihood of the children's appreciation. but don't import a moral stance on child nudity without arguing the stance. don't spend 90% of an article on a lesson of the history of philosophy, just to hide the main issue under a rug.

"Several centuries of moral thinking say that it is wrong."

no it doesn't.

Nicely reasoned bushbasher.

Bowden writes;

"if we were to explore whether Bill Henson’s photographs could cause harm to any of the children, we would come up with a doubtful maybe."

A very doubtful maybe. The connection to any form of harm is just so loose and woolly that it should be dismissed without a second thought.

“But if we combine it with the injunction to respect the autonomy of others, we have a much clearer guideline.”

I can’t see that at all. Parents make decisions for their kids, with or without the child’s input. Parents, teachers, other kids and society overall affect our children in positive and negative ways, as a result of decisions made by parents and completely independent of any decisions.

We can only respect the autonomy of children up to a point. We override their autonomy in many ways, for their own good.

I can’t see how the decisions of parents and their kids to pose for Henson in any way falls outside of our society’s accepted level of respect for the autonomy of others.

No need to apologize bushbasher! I appreciate your frankness.

I get the impression that you took Bowden's words to mean a little more than he intended, and yourself and others seem to interpret Bowden's text as evidence of a passionate opponent of Henson, or super-wowser. However, his argument merely explains the moral basis and rationale for the legal case against Henson, in a strict context of prevailing and precedent judgement leading to this case. At worst, critics could argue (like Lev) that Bowden is too selective or too dismissive of contrary strands of relevant moral philosophy.

Consider the line: "Several centuries of moral thinking say that it is wrong" against your flat contradiction "No it doesn't". Now Bowden's statement asserts merely that there has been much preceding discussion to deny a minor the power of decision over public display of their erogenous body parts. His conclusive sentence is only a simple statement of fact, not the absolutist, iron-clad global argumentative case against Henson in or out of court, in Australia or elsewhere, without possibility for mitigation or contradiction. But your blunt retort indicates that you misinterpreted his sentence to be just such a sweeping and universally absolute statement to the effect that ALL "moral thinking" for "several centuries" would say Henson is wrong.

Bowden's associated comments about Henson using the children, and the children having "virtually no say", are similarly best understood in that same context of legal considerations leading towards investigation and prosecution. Your own counter-arguments could arguably challenge such precedent but, as Bowden's article demonstrates, you would have to make a very formidable case to get such moral and legal thinking changed.

That's why I applaud Bowden's discipline in explaining fundamental elements of the topic in the context of Australian and western jurisprudence. Given his strict adherence to the legal philosophy underpinning the case against Henson, you are incorrect and unfair where you allege irrelevance or absurdity in his article.

Thanks for probing this. I think I now understand better how difficult it is communicating my own more ideological and aesthetic concerns about this case.

mil-observer, thanks for your reply. i'll think more, but a few comments.

1) i agree that bowden does not appear to be a super-wowser. plenty of room left to be a garden-variety wowser.

2) "several centuries of moral reasoning says that it is wrong" has more of the conclusive flavour than you're suggesting, and it deserved to be swatted. perhaps this was merely clumsy wording by bowden, though i doubt it. but my reading is not unfair. minimal moral: pick your last sentence carefully.

3) you are emphasising more than bowden legal notions of consent. i agree that that is a more interesting framing of the question. but you have to be careful of rug-sweeping. kids are not allowed to drive cars, or drink. but i know many 12 year olds who have driven farm tractors, and many will have a glass of wine with dinner. the legal notion of childen not being able to consent obviously has a large moral element and history/basis of moral philosophy. but this has to be teased out much more than bowden has done.

as i suggested above, if henson's models were filmed kicking and screaming as they were hauled into henson's studio, the henson-bashers would be screaming blue murder about (moral) consent. It would be hugely different from what the evidence actually suggests occurred.

i don't see how any of this differentiation appears, or can appear, in henson's moral calculus. and, he gives no credit to the evidence in the actual henson situation - no evidence of harm, and clear evidence of non-harm, of (later) strong and considered appreciation.

4) if we're talking legal, it is worth noting that the actual law which may apply to henson: it seems hugely unlikely that he could be found guilty, to the point that the cops and the dpp seem to be running scared. if the law is thus condoning immoral acts, then why? it doesn't undercut bowden, but it is not irrelevant.

having said all that, you have given me things to think about. more than bowden's article. thanks.