Interesting idea, but what happens when you lose your wallet and your card is lost?

Sadly, Dr Cox, this is an excellent technical solution to what is essentially a political problem.

The concept of a voluntary system limits its use to equally voluntary commercial participants - the government is unlikely to be interested in a system that can be legitimately avoided. As such, it provides little additional benefit over existing identification systems, except - perhaps - in commercial risk minimization.

The critical area that is not outlined in the brief description here is how, exactly, will an individual be able to obtain one? This procedure needs to be foolproof, in the sense that one individual can never, under any circumstances, be able to hold two of them. Also, that the system cannot be used to "create" an individual from scratch, using for example forged driver's license, temporary rented premises as a home address and so on.

Another area rarely addressed in these cases is what to do if you obtain an Edentiti, but it is then lost or stolen. Who, exactly, polices this, and how? This alone would - one would most sincerely hope - prevent the system being used to obtain an "official" identity.

Privacy is a precious attribute, and any proliferation of "means of identity" can only decrease our stock of it. If, or when, we are required by law to be permanently identifiable to the world, we will have lost the last vestige of privacy, and will have been given absolutely nothing in return.

"encrypted identification number."
What's the point of encrypting it? If no one can get the number from the card it doesn't need to be encrypted and if can be retrieved then the encrypted version can be copied and used in its place.

"impossible and illegal to store ID card information in other data repositories"
It's impossible, but it also needs to be illegal? That doesn't add up.

"Each individual has a set of online authenticated verified identifying data that they control, they supply and which requires their permission to access."
Data that exists in the hands of someone else, ie. edentiti. And it requires a connection for authentication to take place, thus edentiti could potentially create an audit log viewable in real time, containing at least the time and organisation of every single authentication or transaction.

"with permission from the individual, gives the minimum information needed and gives a new number that the organisation is to use for identification."
It would still be possible for organisations to use that data, or the data on the card itself, to identify people beyond a single relationship and thereby share personal details with other organisattions.

Biometric IDs would certainly reduce ID theft, but it won't work for systems or personal computers that are compromised.

The author thanks people for the comments as it helps work out how to better explain what is proposed.

We have answers to all the issues raised but I cannot answer them in the 350 words allowed so I will do it over a couple of posts. There are two important principles in the system design that need to be better explained.

The first is that an edentiti is controlled by the individual and NOT by any other organisation. That is everything that happens to the edentiti is known by and approved by the individual. Hence the person looks after their own identity and has the tools to do so. This helps prevent abuse because we do not depend on "the system" to protect us but we look after our own identity.

The system also works on the assumption that data about a person will be misused and that people will attempt to steal identities. As well as making it difficult to steal we have set up mechanisms that make it very likely that any attempt will be detected. Hence the remark it is impossible and illegal is not contradictory. It may be "impossible" in the sense that there are no known ways it could be done but that is not to say it will remain impossible for ever and hence we make it illegal if the impossible is ever achieved.

Short answers to some of the other issues. The card itself does not have the authenticating data on it. Thus you lose the card and you can be reissued with another one and the old one is cancelled when someone tries to use - in exactly the same way credit cards now work. The authentication of your identity is done not from the card but from other data and from your interaction.

More in a second response.

Second part of the author's response.

A mistake in thinking about the issue is that an id card has to be universal and everyone has to have one. It doesn't. Other methods of identification can be acceptable. However if it makes life easier then it will be adopted.

The idea that a person cannot hold two identity cards is also not a requirement of an id card system. An id card system is something that identifies you so that you can be "found" or so that it is the physical you that matches the card. Sometimes I am an individual, sometimes I am the member of an organisation. Why shouldn't I have two id cards?

A person cannot create an edentiti from documentation alone. They need to present themselves, have biometrics recorded, have referees, and have "friends" who vouch for them.

Once a person has established certain information then they cannot change it without other edentities agreeing to the change.

Keeping data in silos makes it is easier to maintain privacy because every organisation knows you by a different number. It is possible to use other information to data match but if an organisation does match they are obliged to tell you. The important point is they cannot use ID numbers for matching.

Edentiti has an agreement with users that it will not "look" at or use the data about the person in any way that the person does not agree to. Of course Edentiti (or any other identity provider) could break the agreement but why would it because it would be out of business and liable for prosecution.

The point about encryption is that you can't get the number from the card unless you are the individual who owns the card. You can only get the encrypted data and that is of no use.

I would ask people to throw away the idea of how you think ID card systems work and think of it as a static representation of a unique dynamic electronic identity that the individual controls.

The problem will be identifying individuals so that the thing is accurate in the implementation. Several major sources of ID will be required- how do we identify maybe 5-10% of citizens that fall outside the ID requirements (no tax file or medicare number)& those people that simply will ignore it?
It's useless if voluntary as its purpose is to identify, not inform.
The Implementation of an 'Australia Card' will not 'Identify', it will simply allow the database accessors to invade privacy to a great extent.
I suggest we examine the 'Cards' proposing this scheme & check that they are truly 'Australian'!

Not good enough. You still haven't addressed the question why would anyone need a "unique dynamic electronic identity", or who would pay for it and why. If you still need the same old 100 points to get one, what advantages does it have over my driving licence, and to whom? All I seem to have is a token that identifies me to myself - after all, it is created and controlled by me. In no way has it created an identifier in any abstract sense; if I am able to have multiples of these cards - created, say, at different times and with different referees and different validating documentation (which could be forged) - then the information it holds has no abstract value either. The people I show it to cannot rely upon it any more than they can rely on my credit card.

It still looks very much like a solution that is desperately searching for a problem.

Author’s response to the post by Pericles.

Organisations that need to know who you are or who need to reliably know some characteristic about you will pay for the card. Financial Institutions, gambling places, suppliers of adult material, employers, airlines, returning officers etc. They have to establish your identity now and this will be less expensive and more reliable as you create and maintain it.

The 100 points is used because that is the way society has been conditioned to understand identity but your unique electronic identity is a representation of you beyond 100 points and has biometrics (eg. photo, voice prints), referees, links to people you trust, and links to organisations with whom you deal. The more you use it the closer it represents your identity which, in this context, is the sum of your social relationships. If you tried to create a duplicate identity you would need new documentation, a new voice, plastic surgery and have a different social network – and then you would no longer match the first edentiti you created!

The information in your edentiti and hence the information on the card has to be verified physically by an independent third party.
You can have multiple cards but you only have one relationship with a particular organisation. That is you have to use a particular card for a given purpose and you cannot use different cards for the same purpose.

The problem being solved is “how can I as an individual identify myself once and once only so that I can use my identification in a privacy friendly way for all those organisations who need a reliable way of knowing some of my characteristics".

Are we in north korea ? Are we ?
Don't encourage this idea of an ID card .
Once we've all been issued with one it'll only be a
matter of time and we'll be required to produce it on demand
when in a public place .. think about that.
Anyway a plastic card with your name on it in your pocket won't
stop you from doing somthing nasty , will it .

The author's response to Jamo

Plastic cards are convenient. We use them because they make our life easier. What we have proposed is a system where the card is NOT us but it is used BY us when WE need to identify ourselves.

We have proposed an approach for ID cards that gives some protection against its misuse by governments, corporations and others. If we do not do something along the lines suggested sooner or later - and probably sooner - we WILL get issued with a government ID card with not only our name but a unique number on it and it will have none of the protection that is built into the system we propose.

Of course cards don't stop bad people or bad governments doing bad things. However, we can have cards that make it harder for them to do bad things to us while allowing us to use cards for "good things".

Mr Cox, could you please explain-
“Organisations that need to know who you are or who need to reliably know some characteristic about you will pay for the card. Financial Institutions, gambling places, suppliers of adult material, employers, airlines, returning officers etc. They have to establish your identity now and this will be less expensive and more reliable as you create and maintain it.”
By the way, if my identity is a saleable item, ’I’ shall determine the price. I may be a little expensive for some…

Author's reply to Swilkie – thank goodness someone has seen what this is all about.

It currently costs a bank $20+ to establish your 100 point authenticated account.

Employers pay hundreds of dollars to check out the credentials of employees.

Gambling bodies are meant to establish that you are over 18 years of age as are sellers of pornography. They will pay for a method that keeps the identity of the person hidden while guaranteeing that the person is of legal age because it makes it more attractive to buyers.

The cost of reestablishing a password for an online bank account is $30+.

I am unsure of the cost of a credit check but BayCorp, one of two companies in Australia to provide this information, was recently valued at $450M.

People will pay to get rid of 100 different logons and passwords for one logon/password.

Market research companies will pay to know my age, sex and income plus every thing I purchased and when I purchased it(but not know who I was).

Your identity is valuable and information about you is valuable and you should benefit from it and you should not provide it unless you want the service or money the other party is able to supply you.

The idea of a voluntary identity is that you are in control and if you are not willing to part with your identity information for the services provided then you do not have to do it.

People assume because I talk about an ID Card that I am championing the idea of exploiting identities. That is exactly the opposite to what is proposed. Society has resisted the idea of an ID Card because in their guts people believe it is a way for corporations and governments to exploit us. What we are proposing is a method that gives us the advantages of an ID but where we are NOT exploited and our privacy remains intact.

To see what will happen if we don't do something proactive go to
http://www.adcritic.com/interactive/view.php?id=5927