It will be interesting to see what parts of the Australian society & economy receive benefit from the impending “free trade agreement” with China. My comments are as follows –
The further depletion of the Australian manufacturing sector will occur through the removal of the minimal tariff barriers that currently exist. Local manufacturing has come under progressively increasing competition from imports sourced from SEA & mainland China since the deregulation of the Australian dollar in the 1980’s. The commonly inhuman labour laws that our friends in Asian countries are subject to accounts for a large part of their much cheaper manufacturing base & it is a case of compete or die for many of our major employers. The social strata that has suffered & will suffer further is obvious. I don’t believe we should be entering agreements as such with nations that at least need to provide sustainable working conditions for the majority, let alone those known to commonly abuse internationally recognised human rights.
Those Australian manufacturers with a sufficient capital base will continue to compete by relocating operations in the above-mentioned countries. This will not necessarily affect the shareholder, but will certainly impact upon the employee. The question that should be asked is whether the advantages of this part of the agreement are balanced across the social classes. I think not.
Our major exports to Asia are Primary. Increases in production/export of grain & mineral ore from Australia will not result in greater profits flowing to the worker. These are not labour intensive industries.
Do the macro-economic benefits & closer social & economic ties that will result from such an agreement benefit more than a minority of the Australian population? I think not

A very useful and wide ranging rundown of China's bilateral concerns on its borders, particularly regarding Pakistan.

The author touches on Sino-Russian relations vis a vis Mongolia but I'd be interested in his views on the direct Chinese-Russian relationship concerning trade and any border disputes over resources. Relations with Kazakstan are also interesting.

Looking forward to the second instalment - North Korea's nuclear announcements must course angst in Beijing and Moscow. I see the angst not only deriving from spectre of a "twitchy" state deploying nuclear weapons but also from the possible future increase in Japanese conventional and (perhaps) nuclear forces in response.

Therefore I look forward to the author’s views on Chinese or joint Chinese-Russian pressure (economic or otherwise) to dissuade North Korea from its nuclear stance.