I agree, if you oppose abortion/embryonic stem cell research, you should oppose war as well. There are very, very few cases where war is somewhat more morally acceptable than no war. These are in instances of true self-defence and/or in cases of defeating some sort of evil enemy, where the effects of war are not as bad as allowing this enemy the unbridled right to continue. (Please note, I absolutely do NOT include the Iraqi war in this category). However, even these cases can be quite complex, and they are much more rare than our politicians would have us believe. The question is, if we can risk lives in even this most extreme form of war to prevent further harm, why not destroy embryos in the hope that one day we might be able to find some sort of treatment to a number of illnesses? I think the prolifers would answer, because soldiers and rebels have a choice as to whether or not they are willing to risk their lives to defeat some sort of enemy. Embryos (seen as real human beings) do not.

I'm always amazed when people try and make this argument.
There is a moral difference between an intentional killing of a (defenseless) life (which is also illegal in war) and an accidental death (in war or otherwise). You equivocate on this point when you restrict the objection to ESC to being "a desecration of human life, never to be allowed." (Although many people on both sides simplify it to this, the context is almost always in terms of intentionally killing an innocent and defenseless life.) The topic is a lot more grey than you would have us believe.

Just as a person who says that war in some circumstances is justified, is not inconsistent to oppose torture.

Also, You seem to be arguing on consequentialist grounds against a moral stand that is almost always deontological. You cannot claim this is a contradiction or inconsistency when you do this.

Finally, in cases where one force locates itself within civilian areas, the geneva conventions are clear that it is their moral culpability in what follows.

Why there is even debate on this is a mystery to me. It's not like anyone is proposing a policy of terminating pregnancies for the purpose of harvesting stem cells. The embryos in question are going to perish in any event, quite legally, as a result of our present abortion laws.

Only a spiteful moron, or someone who has never seen medical tragedies up close, could make high handed moral arguments against finding cures and remedies for so many of the ailments which plague our species

I will get this out of the way I support stem cell research and I oppose the Iraq war.

I have to say though that this seems to me a silly argument. Soldiers are volunteers who know that they may be called on by Governments (duly elected) to serve in hostile territories, and possibly for causes they do not personally believe in. I am not sure a foetus has that capacity to choose and that much knowledge or information.

Also supporting a war for a just cause seems to me morally sound. Whether Iraq is a just cause is the problem.

I think that the article is quite reasonable. Even amongst the Judeo-Christian religions there is total disagreement on the state of the embryo - is it complete human life or just potential life? We probably will never know. The different groups which quote God's words on the subject have surprisingly different views on what God actually was supposed to have said.

Surely a fully formed soldier is more alive than any embryo or foetus? Thus killing an embryo which possibly is not yet human in the expectation of saving humans must be morally better than killing a soldier who is definitely fully alive.

Alan Grey, I think the objectors to stem cell research are more often adherents to natural law theory, drawing inspiration from Aristotle (as adopted by Aquinas) than deontologists. Their arguments depend on the doctrine of double effect, which forbids the intentional doing of an objectively wrong action, whatever the consequences. As you'd be aware, the doctrine permits doing an objectively right action, even if there are evil consequences, provided those consequences are not intended (but merely foreseen), and provided that they are proportionate. The account of a just war that is derived requires not only that the cause be just, but that there is no alternative, better, means to the end, that the end is achievable, and that the good obtained is not outweighed by the harm caused. It used to be argued that a just war had to be declared by a legitimate prince--a position which I think translates in the modern world to a requirement of proper processes in the declaration of war.

Notoriously, none of these applied to the declaration of war against Iraq.

The DDE and deontological theory would both require the rejection of shock and awe tactics, wouldn't they? So I think there is a problem of consistency.