Thank you. It is refreshing to read an article which breaks down the idea of left and right, good and evil etc. So often we are presented with a persuasive view which negates to explore both sides of the complex spectrum of an issue. This article is a tour de force by looking to the questions and issues which need to be the focus of economics today.

“How exactly do we differentiate “simplistic” from “true” moral judgments - if it can be done at all?”

Good question.

“The best approach, as usual, is to work from practical cases…”

That risks assuming what is in issue. Let’s say we look at a practical case, and we approve of what is being done. So we say “these are true moral judgments”. Then we look at a practical case, and disapprove. So we say “these are simplistic, or false, moral judgments”.

The point is, unless we have a principal to distinguish good from bad, then our judgments will be at best arbitrary or confused, and at worst, disguised special pleading.

Fred thinks that the state should guarantee the provision of such and such. But I think the state should also provide friends, socks, and a velodrome. Why do I think this? For “equity”. Ultimately a discussion framed this way is no more than an argument “I want this” versus “I want that”, which ultimately resolves into “Tis’!” “’Tisn’t!” etc.

At the level of theory, it is arbitrary, and in practice, it becomes nothing but a power-grab – an abuse of power.

It seems to me to be mistaken to think there is a divide between ethics and economics. Both of them are about subjective values that humans think should be acted on. But economics allows arithmetic calculation in terms of money prices. In that sense, economics is a sub-set of ethics, the study of values.

A person acts on all his subjective values, both those which can, and those which cannot, be calculated in terms of prices. That’s why we don’t boil down our children to make soap, even if the income would exceed the expenses.

The author talks about redistribution to reduce inequity. But there is no evidence that taxation does that. Taxation aims to take from A who has more, and give to B who has less. Thus the criterion for redistribution by taxation is *inequality*, not *inequity*.

To assert that taxation reduces inequity, we must first conclude that there was something *unfair*, as well as unequal, about the original person’s ownership of his own property that was taken by the state’s threatening to lock him in a cage, which is how they get the money.

The ethical blank on the author’s map has to do with the state’s use of violence or threats. We usually think of coercion as being anti-social. Yet coercion underlies all the state’s revenue, and therefore redistributions. Thus the ethical question of the use of coercion is necessarily imported into the question on the ethics of redistribution.

Ultimately, re-distributionists are denying the proposition that you own your own life. They deny that you own your own labour and the fruits of your labour. They assert that someone else has the right to decide how your labour, and therefore the only thing you have in this life – your time – will be disposed of.

Forced redistributions are demonstrably unethical because they violate the right of self-ownership.

Yet no-one will answer the ethical challenge to show how this compulsory expropriation of labour can be distinguished from forced labour or slavery, apart from the circular arguments of legality or majority opinion.

Majority opinion is not an ethical justification, any more than it would justify a rape. And legality in a democracy merely resolves back into majority opinion.

It is easy to see how both ethics and economics are based in the axiom that one own’s one’s own life. Anyone denying this, must be involved in a self-contradiction. If you deny it, then you deny you have the right to speak for yourself: bring us instead the person who has that right.

If you cannot show the *ethical* distinction between slavery and forced redistributions, then you should be calling for the abolition of forced redistributions.

The minimum content of the principal to distinguish good from bad must be that the good excludes the use of aggression as a basis for social co-operation.

No-one today will dare to assert the ethics of slavery: except the re-distributionists!

Wing Ah Ling,you suppose that the principles of liberty and of ownership are the foundations of ethics. Those are odd claims, given that most moral philsophers have seen a need to justify both of them.

A justification of a principle justifies also some exceptions. For example, Mill's justification of liberty, on the grounds that it increases happiness, justifies compulsion when permitting liberty creates unhappiness. Hence his exception for children, barabarians and the insane. Hence also his exception when liberty is used to cause harm.

Making ownerhip of one's life basic requires others to value your owning it rather than valuing the life itself. That will imply that there is no justification in interfering when a person wants to commit suicide for bad reasons. A better start along your lines is to ask what it is about a personal life that gives it value.

Note too that ownership interferes with liberty; and that liberty is of little value whe there are no opportunities to exercise it.

Ozbib

An appeal to ‘most philosophers’ is
a) an appeal to absent authority, and
b) majoritarian.

The great advantage of asserting self-ownership as the basis of ethics, liberty and property, is that *everyone* agrees, explicitly or implicitly. Even to participate in argument to deny it, you implicitly assert ownership of your own body and speech-act to enable you to participate. Also the argument can be carried through consistently for children, barbarians and the insane - (but not for rugby league players, naturally).

Once we assert another standard – for example what it is about a personal life that gives it value, we are back to the original problem. One person says it’s God, another says it’s soccer, and so on – six billion of ‘em.

John Stuart Mill’s argument on liberty, correct me if I’m wrong, was that the only justification for forcibly interfering with another’s liberty, is self-protection. Thus by definition, the justification of force to defend against aggression is not an ‘exception’ to the principle of liberty: it is an intrinsic part of it.

For that reason, ownership does not interfere with liberty, because ownership does not confer a right to aggress against the ownership of others.

Cases where there are “no opportunities” to exercise liberty do not justify even more oppression; and do not describe any of the circumstances in which property is confiscated from people to fund forced redistributions.

It is true that the principle of self-ownership denies that you have a right to forcibly stop someone else from committing suicide for what you consider a bad reason. What if he considers it a good reason? You are back to denying the principle of self-ownership. Then bring us your owner.

Thus you have not shown any justification for beating people into submission, or threatening them with it, in order to force them into submitting to having their lives and values commandeered, or their property confiscated, which ultimately is the principle for which re-distributionists are necessarily contending.

Let's cut to the chase: how can the compulsory expropriation of labour be ethically distinguished from forced labour?

I don't believe ethics is about self. If a person lives totally alone on an island, without even a pet for company, can any action of theirs be described as 'ethical'?
It takes 2 to tango. Introduce one more person to the island, and inevitably, in some form or other, one will be 'stronger' than the other. How that strength is used will define how 'ethical' that person is.

Grim
True. The point of ethics is indeed for the preservation of social co-operation.

However what you have said provides no justification whatsoever for the use of aggression in order to get what one wants from others, just because one can’t be bothered obtaining their consent, and claims to be morally above the ethical requirements of peaceful social co-operation.

I notice no-one will answer the challenge of explaining how the forced expropriation of human effort can be ethically distinguished from slavery; nor who else’s authority I would need to confirm in order to know that you have the moral right to engage in this discussion.

The problem is that the redistributionists can show no ethical or intellectual justification for their desire to bully others into submission in the name of social justice; and once we subtract from the argument their fake moral superiority, there is nothing left.

Otherwise, what are the answers to the questions?

Once upon a time, the rulers ruled by the strength of their arms, literally. Tribal leaders rose to their positions by being the strongest, the toughest and the most ruthless.
And women and children, and weaker men were abused and exploited. Of course, not all strong men were abusers; in medieval times a custom of 'chivalry' evolved, implicitly acknowledging that all people were not -physically- equal, and that the strong had a moral duty to defend the weak.
Centuries later, Samuel Colt developed a hand gun, which he described as 'the equalizer'. He claimed that no longer would the strong be able to exploit the weak, as even small people could fire a gun.
As anyone who grew up on TV and movie westerns can attest, guns didn't really equalise. Some men were always going to be faster; faster reflexes, faster to anger, faster to kill. John Wayne aside, you no longer had to be the biggest, to abuse and exploit others.
Finally Law came to the West. This was supposed to be the ultimate equaliser. Even women and children had (eventually) a right to be treated as equals, before the law. No longer would an accident of birth, of genetics, give one person the right to exploit or abuse another.
You think?
Now the 'strong' aren't the fastest with a gun, but fastest with a pen. They may not be physically the biggest, but they are still the most ruthless; still the most selfish, the most greedy.
The simple fact is, if the Law worked as it should, unions should never have been necessary.
The strong still dominate the (economically) weak, and can anyone not question the adage “equal before the Law”, when lawyers command such prices?
The number of 'strong men' who retain any respect for the ancient concept of chivalry, of moral duty, of voluntarily using their strength to protect, defend and support those (economically) smaller and weaker than themselves, is vanishingly small.
Which is the greater freedom? Freedom from exploitation, or the freedom to exploit others without scruple or mercy?
An ethical question.

You have not given any reason to think that the law will not itself be used as an instrument of exploitation.

You merely assume, in an utterly circular argument, that those whose actions are based on a legal monopoly of violence and fraud, will produce outcomes that will be more ethical, than if the outcomes were based on consent. But you have not explained what it is about violence, or fraud, or majority opinion that justifies this conclusion.

And let's be honest. The reason you have not answered the challenge as to self-ownership, is because you can't. So why don't you admit that you think you own your own life, or show us who does? Why don't you explain how you distinguish ethically between taxation and forced labour?

Is this the best the re-distributionists can come up with: evasion and circular argument

"Shrieks of silence", their only reply.

Ah-Ling. Give me time. Sensible comments aren't made in minutes. For the record, it is easy to show that the principle of liberty is not the foundation of ethics. It is quite difficult to demonstrate that people are entitled to keep their property, no matter how poor those who helped them get it are. It is not too hard to demonstrate, in some widely held moral theories, that there are limits to the entitlement to keep property. Reaching a general principle of redistribution, however, is a book-length project. You might try reading the second edition of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, especially the material in support of his difference principle.

Jardine, I made no claim that what most moral philosophers say is to be accepted on that ground. Rather, the point was a rebuttal of Wing Ah-Ling's claim that it is easy to see that ethics and economics are based on the axiom that one owns one's own life. Utilitarians and other consequentialists don't accept it. (That includes orthodox Islamist ethicists as well as many Western philosophers.) Neo-Aristotelians don’t accept it. (That includes orthodox Catholic ethicists.) Deontologists don’t accept it. Principalists don’t accept it. That is a lot of people who don’t think it is obvious at all.
You claim that in entering a debate, I implicitly assert ownership of my body and speech act[s]. I don’t think I own either in the same sense that I own my computer. (I think I AM my body—or at least part of it.) Nor do I own my life in that sense. But even if I’m wrong about that, it does not follow that I must consider that ownership is the foundation of ethics, or that it is the most important thing about myself. I assume also that all three of us are rational, and that the truth therefore matters to us. Does it follow that rationality is the foundation of ethics? I also assume a degree of autonomy. (I note that there is a common—but by no means universal—belief that it is rational autonomy that makes human beings morally significant.)

But it does not follow that people are entitled to do whatever they wish, whatever the consequences.
Mill’s exception is for actions that cause harm to others. Property does not come into this. Autonomy does. Children have some autonomy, but lack knowledge, and so may commit self-harm unwittingly, or not understand what the harm they are doing involves. It is surely obvious that we should not allow them the freedom which we accord to adults. But both your position and that of Ah-Ling imply that we should.
If a person is going to commit suicide in the belief that their situation is hopeless, and they are mistaken, then I am entitled to intervene, to point out a way through and to offer help. I may prevent them long enough for them to discover their real options. However, I do think that if they fully understand the facts and have considered their alternatives, then they are entitled to do it. I think that that is obvious. But if you don’t accept either example, I will find some more. In any case, I think you have a better case for saying that I deny the significance of their autonomy rather than their self-ownership. (To be fair, I note that you could argue that suicide is a special case, in that a person is destroying their autonomy along with themselves. I respect their worth by denying them the opportunity to destroy it.)
People rarely get to own property substantially more than that of others by their own unaided labour. Nor do they become highly wealthy merely because they work harder. Indeed, a person cannot work enough hours to make great wealth merely by working longer and faster. The notion that both you and Ah-Ling suppose, that people obtain their wealth by their labour, and thus requiring them to give some away makes them slaves, is questionable. They can be required to give away what they have not, in that sense, earned.

This thread has become somewhat intimidating to anyone not grounded in an understanding of philosophical theory, so I approach it with some trepidation.

But - attractive as the discussions on the foundations of ethics have been so far - I'm not sure we are addressing the essentially practical nature of Ms Chambers' piece.

The quote at the beginning of the article is important. It encourages us to examine our own role in the current financial mess, and our laissez-faire approach to governance and government.

An attitude of "What they do suits me fine, so I'll go along with it" has been behind a number of habits that would have appalled the post-1918 generations, who necessarily lived more thriftily than we do. And whose commerce leaders were - largely - less inclined to look for the friction-free profitability of, say, interest arbitrage, and more interested in building dynastic businesses.

It is important for us to question the fundamentals of what we want out of life, why we want it and what we are going to do about it. Because it is that contemplation, whether inbred, instinctive or taught, that guides our attitude (read: ethical motivations) towards work, family and society.

It was this important point that the article made. That there is the emergence of a glimmer of a scintilla of a tiny spark of evidence of this, in a speech by the Head of Treasury.

And I hate to say it, because I have genuinely enjoyed the discussion to date, we are not going to make progress in this direction by educating the masses in the art of philosophical discourse.

We need to start using, as Ms Chambers points out, a language that reflects some new level of ethical dealing between people, that does not automatically assume that being wealthy is the same as being clever, or that profit, both personal and corporate, is an absolute measure of value.

Having said that, I haven't a clue where to start.

Yes, I see now it was nasty of me to use a circular argument to describe a linear progression (spanning centuries, describing a progression of birthrights to allow the exploitation of the less fortunate by the fortunate).
Do you believe it is ethical for someone who just happened to be born strong, to dominate the weak? Or someone who was born the son of a strong man, to dominate the weak? In bygone times, such a person might claim 'Ius Primae noctis' at your daughters' wedding, or your own.
Is that your concept of Liberty?
Do you believe it is ethical for someone who is fast with a gun (and willing to kill) to dominate the weak?
The point is, these people didn't earn the right to their genetic inheritance. There is no such thing as a 'self made' man. No one gets to choose whether they are going to be strong or fast; and certainly no one chooses to be unintelligent.
Our current society supports, even encourages 'type A' personalities; those who are insecure, and need to prove themselves, driven overachievers who are ambitious, ruthless and greedy.
It appears to be becoming more and more true that 'nice guys finish last'.
Unless you are a God botherer, who believes it is God's will that the strong are born to dominate the weak, the only justification for one opinion supplanting another, is that there are more people agreeing with the first opinion than the second.
This is called 'Democracy'. It ain't great, it's just better than the alternatives.
And the law (democratically written) is supposed to stop the strong from exploiting the weak.
Taxes are a function of Law.

You did manage to come up with one thing I agree with, Wing:
“You have not given any reason to think that the law will not itself be used as an instrument of exploitation.”
Very true. Currently, all the lazy bludgers who make the median wage (35k) are going to get a whopping 6 bucks cut from their tax bill, while the poor hard workers unfortunate enough to share the same tax bracket as our legislators (over 100k) will have to struggle along with a lousy 30 bucks cut.
There is very little chance the Law will protect the (economically) weak, when laws are written by the (economically) strong.
As to the question of redistribution of taxes, this is obviously a hangover from an earlier, more chivalrous age, which is quickly being 'corrected'.
Or is it a hangover from an age when legislators were more representative of their constituents, instead of career lawyers, and money managers?
Either way, it is simply a recognition of the fact that the more fortunate have some simple obligation of Humanity, to support the less fortunate.
Particularly as in most (arguably, all) cases, their fortune comes from the labour of the weak.
Is it ethical to 'coerce' the rich into giving up some of their wealth to support the poor?
Perhaps not. Perhaps it would be more ethical to wait for the rich to donate that money freely.
Yeah, that's going to happen.
Pericles, hear hear. (You snuck your very worthy post into the middle of my tirade.)
As I have indicated, I believe going back to representative government, rather than elitist government, would be a good start.
As you say, getting people engaged is the problem.

Ozbib
“[I]t does not follow that people are entitled to do whatever they wish, whatever the consequences.”

No-one is arguing that. Rather, people are entitled to do whatever they wish, so long as they are not aggressing against the person or property of others.

“[I]t is easy to show that the principle of liberty is not the foundation of ethics.”

Maybe so, but you haven’t shown it.

The Deontologists et al. *do* accept that they own their own bodies by the very fact of their speech-acts – that’s the whole point. Everyone does. They prove it by their actions, whatever their words may say.

Obviously you don’t own your body in the same sense that you own your computer, but that doesn’t mean you don’t own your body. But if you don’t, who does? Answer? A majority of whatever group manages to get the weapons to call the shots? Because that is what the redistributionist argument comes down to.

“…no matter how poor those who helped [people] get [property] are.”

This idea is problematic. The state’s forced re-distributions do not give to ‘people who helped one get one’s property’ but in the sense that they are members of human society. This provides just as much justification for the rest of mankind to participate in the forced redistributions. In fact obviously, those in Africa, India etc would be more entitled than Australians.

Also, you assume that the poverty of others has got nothing to do with the actions of the re-distributionists. But in fact the main practical argument against such interventions is precisely that they are the main cause of the poverty and disadvantage that they are intended to remedy; they actively worsen it. A classic example is with the Aborigines.

Also, in asserting a claim to other people’s property based on inequality, it is arbitrary where, short of equality, this claim could end. Such equality is impossible in practice but even if it were not, it would spell the end of human society, because no-one could obtain any advantage from associating with others.

In short, the idea is bad in principle and bad in practice.

“People rarely get to own property substantially more than that of others by their own unaided labour.”

They also rarely get it without giving valuable consideration. The consent of the person they got it from answers all ethical issues *so far as force is concerned*.

You have not established any moral title in anyone else; nor have you shown how, if others use force to get it, it can be ethically distinguished from robbery. The fact that a robber is in a position to declare his own crimes legal is no justification.

Grim
At least you recognize that political action causes injustices that cannot be fixed by more political action.

If 12 men and one woman vote whether to have sex, and the men vote for, and the woman votes against, so they coerce her into it, that doesn’t mean it’s okay, and it doesn’t mean it’s not rape.

Democracy adds nothing to the ethics but majority opinion. However majority opinion is not capable of supplying the ethical justification for violating someone else’s person or property.

It is the redistributionists, not the advocates for freedom, who are contending for the idea that the strong, by that fact, have a right to dominate and exploit the weak.

Pericles
No-one is suggesting that being wealthy is the same as being clever; nor that profit is an absolute measure of value.

But what profit does show is that the person who made it was able to adjust the factors of production in such a way that the result, the product, was better at satisfying the most urgent needs of the people, *as judged by themselves*, than was the arrangement of the factors of production before he got involved. He should not be vilified or suspected for this contribution to human welfare. It is not anti-social; he is not hurting anyone; he is not exploiting anyone; he is not exercising “power” as against them. Their consent answers the ethical issues.

All
No-one has justified forced re-distributions.

ISTM that the principle reason for redistribution of wealth is to minimise the potential for unrest caused by a resentful or inadequately housed/clothed/fed underclass. Yes, the amounts may be arbitrary and what constitutes "adequate" may be debatable, but without the effort being made, such resentment has boiled over frequently throughout history, creating much upheaval.

The redistribution needn't be a forced one, it may be entirely voluntary, such as Gates with his foundation or Buffett with his, but to do so with force is arguably more "fair" in the sense that not all who may gain from the increased social stability may be prepared to contribute their part to the redistribution. Furthermore, if they don't, it may well lead to upheaval among those high-wealth groups, inevitably defeating the purpose of the redistribution.

Where it breaks down, ISTM, is when there is fostered a sense of entitlement to someone else's wealth, based on a nebulous claim. It is much easier for that to occur in a forced-redistributive system, since the people making the decisions as to the "worth" of a claimant for support are not personally linked to the outcome of their decision. For example, if a beggar comes to me in the street and says "please give me $10", I may smell the grog on her breath and refuse: if she goes to centrelink and says "I need the dole", no such problem exists, merely a set of easily-negotiated barriers that can be set aside if the person processing the claim wishes.

The same applies to all sorts of activities that are taxpayer-funded but would be unlikely to have gained support from individual philanthropists. In extremis, such as we now observe in Australia, it leads to an enormously large class of people who see themselves as "entitled" to some of someone else's hard-earned. It has lead to the ridiculous situation in which personal income tax is a net $5billion loss to the state after all the redistributive measures have been applied.

Jardine, do you honestly believe the likes of Buffet and Gates, and the traditional Sultan of Brunei *deserve* to have upwards of $40,000,000,000 each, while almost half the world's population live on less than $2.50 a day?
No one chooses to be born. Gates did no more to earn his intelligence and flair for computer programming, than half the world's population earned the right to be born poor.
Out of the 2.2 billion children in the world, 1 billion live (and die) in poverty. Meanwhile, in 2005 there were less than 500 billionaires in the world, who collectively owned over 3.5 trillion dollars (US).
UNICEF estimated (2006) 25,000 children (under the age of 5) die of poverty related causes every single day.
You ask me to justify re distribution?
Tell me how you justify distribution.

Grim
Let’s assume it comes down to what you or I think others deserve. And let’s assume that we think no-one deserves an unequal amount, for reasons of equity.

So then we would be justified in confiscating any amount over an equal amount, and donating it to others to re-establish equality.

You can see, can’t you, that that would cause the destruction of human society? And that it would not be fair either? Quite apart from being impossible in practice?

You may say that that example is too extreme.

However any lesser redistribution is different only in degree, not in kind. The necessary effect of any forced redistribution is both to create greater poverty and unfairness, not less, for the following reasons.

The high incomes of entrepreneurs, investors, sportsmen, etc. have got nothing to do with moral deserving, nothing to do with their intelligence, nor even talent itself – millions are more deserving.

Their high income is a result of one thing only: they have been able to adjust the factors of production so that *judged from the point of view of the masses as consumers* the result is better in providing them satisfaction or removing dissatisfaction.

Poverty is the original and universal condition of mankind. The process by which the Gates and Buffets become wealthy – profit - *is the same process by which the masses have sovereignty in directing the allocation of capital to satisfy their most urgent needs.*

If you don’t understand this, you should stop until you do.

The poverty of the poor is not because the rich of this world are taking what the poor would otherwise have. It is because of traditional or modern belief systems retarding, or suppressing, the capital accumulation that is the necessary and only process that could relieve it. (An increased quota of capital increases the amount that can be produced with the same inputs.)

A classic example is Burma: traditionally poor, then the wealthiest country in south-east Asia under the British, and now people are starving after 40 years of modern socialist redistributionism.

The collectivist error is collectivism: to look at society's income, as it were, from a God’s-eye point of view. This is to misunderstand human society itself.

The utopian is not God. Society is not a decision-making entity. People are not vast herds of animals owned by governments, to goad them into a better configuration. What drives the process of increasing wealth is individual liberty and people’s *unequal* valuations of what they are exchanging.

The economic ignorance of the redistributionists is a throw-back to the pre-modern moralism when people thought the valid function of authority was to stop the evil of more efficient businesses out-competing inefficient businesses, stop the wickedness of people from accumulating wealth, and stop sinful people from lending money at interest.

Antiseptic
Karl Marx’s theory of in Capital was, in a nutshell, that modern capitalism lowers the masses’ standard of living to subsistence level.

This has now been disproved both in theory and in practice more times than anyone could possibly want. Yet Marx’s error lives on - especially in third world dictatorships and academia in the western world.

The idea that, in the absence of forced redistributions, there would develop this vast desperate underclass at the level of subsistence, originates in Marxist theory, and is precisely back-the-front.

It’s the other way around. It is the accumulation of capital under modern capitalism that causes the general rise in the standard of living. It is the poor who have always benefitted most from capitalism, with its mass production for the masses. Any process that retards capital accumulation, makes conditions worse for everyone *but especially the poorest*. Capitalism de-proletarianises the workers, turning into hobbyists and café-goers, opera buffs and overseas travelers, the class that used to be peasants and subsistence labourers – us!

All
Yes, there will always need to be some provision for the poor; and the wealthier we are, the more we can and will provide. But it should be always by voluntary means – contractual or charitable.

Forced redistributions are self-defeating *when considered from the standpoint of the redistributionists*, as well as completely unethical.

Jardine,
I am not sure why you repeat your argument about bodies. I do not assume that you own your body when writing to you, only that you are embodied. Indeed, were our property convention different, so that you could own a body, you might not own yours. As it is, in Australia, you cannot own your body—nobody can.
If you are your brain, then embodiment is a relation of whole to part. If you are your body, then it is a relation of identity. If you are a soul, it is a relation of inhabiting. None of these is a relation of ownership.
Unless you are a soul (or some such), your continuing existence depends on your body continuing to exist. Because you have value, your continued embodiment matters. But I do not have to assume that you have value in order to write to you, only that you will continue to exist and will be able to and will read what I write.
Embodiment is not ownership. Were we to permit slavery, you might not own your body. But I could still write to you.
You have been misled by a fallacy of equivocation. (Philosophy is hard.)
Notoriously, debates between the proponents of the major moral theories have not led to a single outcome. In spite of some centuries of debate, we have yet to produce a fundamental moral principle which is free of exceptions. But that does not mean that no progress has been made. Deontological theories have been developed and changed since Kant. Rights have been prioritised, basic principles have been related to one another, contractarian approaches have been made more sophisticated. Aristotelian theories have expanded and reorganised the list of kinds of human flourishing, have developed sophisticated accounts of what is a intentional action and have developed methods of ethical analysis of problems which deal with some of the difficulties they face.
Utilitarianism also is not what it was. It has long been an objection that it rationalises harming an individual for the sake of the majority.

It would imply that we could be justified in killing unloved unemployed beggars, for instance, in order to use their organs to save and enrich others. Utilitarians therefore have accepted that they must include the wider social and long-term consequences of actions in their calculations. In the case of the beggar, if we consider the effects on society of it being known that doctors will occasionally kill someone to use their organs, we will see that the overall consequences are bad—people will be terrified, those suffering infectious diseases will flee from hospitals, and so on—and these things will produce a decline in happiness.
This process is enough to remove much of the arbitrariness of assertions about fundamental values. You have to accept not only the value, but the logical consequences of accepting that it is fundamental. If they are obviously immoral, the choice is mistaken. God does not cut the mustard.
To disprove your theory about property, Jardine, I must show not only that it implies that some actions which are clearly wrong are justified or mandatory, and/or that some actions which are clearly mandatory are not required, but that modifications of the theory which will meet the objections destroy the priniciple assertion (that the sole fundamental principle is that people are entitled to keep their property).
I note that you are now saying that we may not offend against the person or the property of others. That is an interesting change—to two values instead of one. Which matters most? When they conflict, which must give way? What counts as an offence against the person? And why do I assume that such offences are wrong when I write to you?
Some problems for the property only view. How are we to distinguish the cases where preventing suicide is justified from those where it is not? Why is causing pain to someone (when the body will recover) morally worse than destroying the vegetables in his garden? (Assuming he won’t starve.) Why should we require a older person in a lifeboat to give up their place to a child?

Ownership, however called, entails the right to use and possess. If someone is to have the right to use or possess, the question is only who, that is all.

When the state denies that self-ownership exists, that merely means they intend to forcibly substitute their decisions on the use or possession of a person for that person’s own: “They would say that, wouldn’t they?” They take the fruits of one labour using force or threats by taxation, require obedience, and imprison for refusal.

All that you have said involves appeal to absent authority or assumes what is in issue. The quibblings of academic philosophers are hardly a recommendation. Almost all of them are government-funded to start with. They have a direct interest in cheer-leading for the supposed prerogative of the state to exercise ownership rights over others, on which depends the payment for their comforts, privileges, and remuneration above the market rate for their skills. They are in the same intellectually compromised positions, as regards their interests, as were the high priests to Pharoah. Their habitat in the ‘universities’ discredits: they are home to every kind of intolerant illiberal ideology, and it is to their ever-lasting disgrace that they are the last bastion of orthodox Marxism and its protean variants, long after this dreary slave philosophy of all-knowing government has been disproved in theory and practice over and over again.

From the original right of self-ownership, follow the rights of freedom of movement, association, to provide services, and to enter into consensual transactiosn: in other words, all property rights and other human rights derive from this basal right.

The fact that other characteristics or faculties co-exist with self-ownership is not an argument against self-ownership, and involves no equivocation. The argument is consistent throughout.

By contrast, nothing that you have said has established a superior right in anyone else to the use or possession of the individual; and if you had, that itself would undermine your own standing to make the argument, leading again into an appeal to absent authority.

“What counts as an offence against the person?”
The initiation of aggression: assault, battery, murder, wounding, slavery, false imprisonment, threats of same.

“And why do I assume that such offences are wrong when I write to you?”

Because they must logically be the basis of ethics and human society?

“When they [rights to person and property] conflict, which must give way?”

What would be an example of them conflicting?

“Why is causing pain to someone (when the body will recover) morally worse than destroying the vegetables in his garden?”

Perhaps because not violating the person is the primary right from which property rights derive?

“Why should we require a older person in a lifeboat to give up their place to a child?”

I don’t know. Should we? Why? We might prefer the child as of sentiment, but not as of right.

“How are we to distinguish the cases where preventing suicide is justified from those where it is not?”

I don’t think we can.

Q.E.D.

“Poverty is the original and universal condition of mankind.”
This is not only unsubstantiated, it is demonstrably untrue. Anthropologists have noted that that -at least in the basics- aboriginals around the Sydney area had a higher standard of living than the European colonials in the early 1800's.
In hunter gatherer societies, there could only be 3 factors which could cause poverty;
Resource -environmental degradation – drought, flood.
Resource (Environmental) denial – slavery, or domination by a stronger tribe.
Resource (Environmental) insufficiency – overpopulation leading to a Malthusian event.
The tragic irony is, we have imposed or are imposing, all 3 of these scenario's on ourselves.
There are only 2 ways to look at wealth. Either it is purely a product of human invention and ingenuity -in which case it is limited only by imagination, or;
It is inextricably tied to resources.
If the former is true, then it doesn't matter how much money we give the poor; we have an infinite supply. To condemn the poor to death by denying a share of an infinite resource is clearly immoral.
If the latter is true, then obviously, the larger the share one person takes, the less there is left for anyone else.

“A classic example is Burma: traditionally poor, then the wealthiest country in south-east Asia under the British...”
The wealthiest country FOR THE BRITISH. The vast bulk of the Burmese people lived in poverty, which is why they wanted to kick the Brits out. Same in Rhodesia; even working class Rhodesians had a great SOL.
The white ones, at least. Sadly, in both cases the new ruling parties learnt too well, from their former masters.

“The process by which the Gates and Buffets become wealthy – profit - *is the same process by which the masses have sovereignty in directing the allocation of capital to satisfy their most urgent needs.*” -In a misregulated market environment.
It's interesting that the anti redistributionists hate regulation, but don't complain about patent and copyright laws.
They complain about paying taxes, but don't complain about having a police force, to protect their wealth. Since the wealthy obviously have more to protect, why shouldn't they pay more?

“It’s the other way around. It is the accumulation of capital under modern capitalism that causes the general rise in the standard of living.”

Capitalists have never shown any interest in raising the standard of living in the workforce; in fact just the opposite. It has been unionism which has improved the average SOL, in spite of the Capitalists. We are seeing the truth of this today, since Hawke's Accord effectively strangled the union movement the gap between rich and poor (between the 'median' and 'average' wage) has grown egregiously. The working classes in this country had the best SOL back in the sixties and seventies, when the union movement was relatively strong.
Today, school teachers have just about managed to elevate themselves out of the working class, simply because they have managed to maintain their union.
And lastly, the unkindest cut of all:
“Yes, there will always need to be some provision for the poor; and the wealthier we are, the more we can and will provide.”
Another statistic from Poverty facts and stats:
“The poorest 40 percent of the world’s population accounts for 5 percent of global income. The richest 20 percent accounts for three-quarters of world income.”
How rich do you have to be, before you can and will provide?
The truth is: For every $1 in aid a developing country receives, over $25 is spent on debt repayment.
This is how the rich look after the poor.
For the vast majority of the Human race, your system just doesn't work, Jardine.

And some more. Why, using ownership as the basis of argument, is it wrong to cheat in a sport? To sledge in cricket or shout while serving in tennis? How do you drive the ordinary obligation to save someone's life, if you can do so at minimal cost to yourself? How do you demonstrate the ordinary virtues of thoughtfulness, kindness, politeness, generosity? What is the basis of special obligations, ie those that you owe to some individuals and not to others, like those of parents to their children?

Wing Ah Ling, you continue to confuse embodiment with ownership. The reason I keep drawing Jardine's attention to the point is that he, like you, supposed that a person must assume the value of property, of ownership, when engaging in a discussion with others. That derivation is doubly fallacious. To be blunter, it is incompetent rubbish.

In none of that do I assume that it is morally acceptable for the state or anyone else to own you. Indeed, I do not think that it is.

I'll ignore your prejudices, but instead point out that I was not appealing to authority at all.
I was illustrating the way that moral theorising works, so that is not the case, as both you and Jardine supposed, that views about the foundation of arguments are arbitrary absent your particular argument. (I'd like to call it 'your transcendental argument' if I may--that's a technical term.)

I'd like to see how you derive the rights you want to from the value of embodiment. I suspect that what you really need is autonomy. That would solve a lot of your problems--possibly even the ones that relate to justice, if you are prepared to accept an obligation to promote autonomy.

The preference for saving children ahead of adults has been argued on the grounds that the adults have had a life, while the children have not. It is not a matter of sentiment (so the argument goes) but of duty. The principle that property is the ultimate value would imply that I would be entitled to keep my place in the boat. I can't at present see how a principle of that the person is not to be violated, or even a principle of the value of autonomy, would do the trick, without a second, independent principle of justice. Something about maximising the outcome for the worst off person, perhaps. There are arguments about how gross inequalities infringe autonomy; but I don't think they deal with the boat.

Ah-Ling, I note that near the end of your last post, you propose a new position, that the principle of not violating the person is the primary right, and that property rights are derived.
My apologies for not crediting this willingness to consider alternative positions. If you go further down this track, I think the next step is to ask what it is about persons which makes it wrong to violate them. The answer is likely to provide reason to believe that the principle of property entitlement has exceptions. But by way of compensation, you may fair better then with a new transcendental argument.