Hi Plantagenet, Peter,

No argument from me regarding F-22 credentials over the F-35, but debate about air combat capability needs to be viewed as a broader package of requirements including ISTAR, aerial tankers, electronic counter measures and air warfare destroyers. Paul L and myself had dialogue these aspects but need for a strong electronic warfare capability was not emphasized.

The US Navy/US Marine Corps EA-6B Prowler (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EA-6B_Prowler) has provided the primary US capability in this regard since retirement of the USAF EF-111 and the Prowler will be replaced by the E/A-18 Growler, a Super Hornet derivative (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EA-18_Growler). USAF future electronic warfare options have moved toward external pods for communications and network jamming and Australia will need such a capability to counter emerging Russian origin long range radars and missile capabilities. Perhaps prudent to await USAF developments which might involve an EF-22, FB-22 or (remotely) stored F-111s.

Both Howard and Rudd Governments have made unrealistic commitments to expand defence expenditure which will clearly have to be backtracked considering the mammoth economic challenges that will face Australia over the next decade. Presently, we do not have any national strategic policy guidance for the rapidly changing regional scenario and Defence White Paper 2008 will conceivably be written around some long range military hardware projects in train which are arguably inappropriate. Invaluable military assets have been unjustifiably shed (such as F-111, Iroquois, Kiowa) without their upgrade potential being optimized, so what other costly capabilities can now be afforded and adequately manned? Politicians, senior bureaucrats and military chiefs must all be held accountable regarding questionable defence planning and expenditure in train.

Put simply, a big reality check is essential so hopefully, debate on defence issues during 2008 will focus on the bigger picture and recognition that Australia cannot afford some of the material projects initiated nor adequately man those capabilities. Stringent cost-benefit analysis should be applied at all levels of defence planning and substantial rationalization of armed forces composition may be necessary to achieve cost-effectiveness.

Hi Pete,

I wonder if you caught the defence liftout on the weekend. There was an intereseting piece from the director of the national strategic policy institute who had a number of interesting things to say.

In particular he argued that Australia only needs a first day of the war aircraft like the f-22 for two reasons
1) if we intend to go it alone against a regional superpower, in which case our fleet will be way too small
2) if the air-air capability of our local competitors becomes too great to be handled by the JSF and superhornets, he felt this unlikely given our likely advantages in tankers, AEW&Cs, electronic warfare etc

The author further pointed out that under current setup the F-22 is only designed to hit stationary targets, not moving targets as you get in real ground support and maritime attack roles which will be bread and butter for the F-35.

Another article in the lift out pointed out the offer to the Norwegian Airforce for 48 F-35s for 58 million each to be ordered between 2012 and 2017. This article points out that were we to join a consortium we could perhaps do even better as 350 odd aircraft are already on order to foreign members of this consortium.

$50 million dollars compares very well with the $150 million for an f-22.

However, I fully agree with the assessment that we should bide our time and not be rushed into a decision. With the arrivals of the new super hornet we have an aircraft which can dominate the regions airpower competitors in the coming decade,

Hi Bushranger71

Please call me Planta or Peter. I’m the same person 

I agree that support aircraft and (surface) AWDs are essential for jamming, coordination, detection and many other tasks. A relatively new and powerful jamming capability is the suter computer program http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suter_%28computer_program%29 . This or a similar system was used by Israeli F-16s to black out or spoof Syrian radars in September 6, 2007 for the raid on the suspected nuclear reactor.

Presumably the E/A-18 Growler will be (or is) even more suter capable than the F-16CJ. If Mr England does not mortally wound the F-22 in his remaining 7 months then an “EF-22” might become a reality.

I agree governments try to buy too much hardware which goes undermanned. Meanwhile DMO people have sound budgetary and careerist reasons to junk F-111s, Iroquois, Kiowas and then move on to exciting expensive problem prone replacement projects.

More than by the way – after doing a bit of research I’m in awe of your achievements outside this forum including your extended service in Vietnam.

Regards

Peter Coates
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Hi Paul L.

Way past my bedtime. I'll reply tomorrow.

Regards

Pete

Hi Paul. L.

Best to cite your sources on Liftout? and Norway?

As the F-35's basic development may continue through 2012 Lockheed's claims on pricing and technical prowess are somewhat ambit. So, yes, its best for Australia to wait or it may be stuck with a defective aircraft.

In the arms trade its never been proven that an early buyer gets a good price. Early buyers are locked in and pay the seller's preferred startup price not any subsequent "off the shelf" markdown price.

A report made in November 2007 by the Pentagon's Defense Contract Management Agency cited here http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-tue-lockheed-pentagon-reviewjun03,0,7964808.story states that Lockheed has very little ability to control costs on the F-35 JSF program.

The report indicated Lockheed's system for tracking costs and schedules has generated "useless" or "suspect" data on the F-35 since the program started in 2001.

"The report cites the management at Lockheed's Ft. Worth plant for making "inappropriate adjustments to data" in some cases, shifting money from management reserves and those projects meeting their budgets to those with overruns. These changes sometimes "misrepresented" program performance."

"At Lockheed's Ft. Worth plant there has been "a serious deterioration of system discipline" that "will ultimately jeopardize the long-term stability" of Lockheed's programs, the report said. "Early identification of overruns will not be possible" and "unexpected cost 'surprises' will be the norm.""

Lockheed’s claims still didn’t wash even with the US Governments most authoritative auditors in March 2008.

The US Government Accounting Office (GAO) in its March report indicated little confidence in the ability of the F-35 program to estimate costs. http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/abstract.php?rptno=GAO-08-569T “While DOD reports that total acquisition costs have increased by $55 billion since a major restructuring in 2004, GAO and others in DOD believe that the cost estimates are not reliable and that total costs will be much higher than currently advertised.”

Looks like this topic may be worth another article some time :)

Regards

Pete

Plantagenet,

Yeah sorry about the references, the Australian doesn't seem to have posted the articles electronically.

The article, "Australia Unlikely to Pursue any F-22 Role" was by Andrew Davies, Director of Operations and capability at Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

His points were that Australia only needs a first day of the war aircraft for two reasons.

1) To go it alone against a regional superpower - in which case our fleet is way too small
2) If Regional Air forces develop a capability which cannot be matched by Super Hornets or JSF - considered unlikely because of our advantages in AEWACS, Tankers and electronic warfare and the fifth generation capabilities of the JSF and to a lesser extent the super hornet

He also preferred the F-35 in the strike role because it has better purpose built ground attack avionics.

The Norwegian airforce article was by Gregor Ferguson.

His point was that the Norwegian Airforce has been offered a binding contract to supply 48 f-35a's at $58.7 million each with deliveries beginning in 2016. With an initial batch of spares, training and support worth an extra $668.2 million the total package will come in at $3.48 billion.

At that price one would imagine that 100 aircraft are easily within budget with money left over for perhaps another squadron.

Thanks for the information Paul. L.

There certainly seems to be enough debate about these aircraft acquisition issues for another OLO article in the next month or two.

Sooo I'll take your well argued points (some valid, some partially, some not :) on notice for a future article.

Meanwhile I've got other projects on the boil.

Final Regards on this thread.

Pete