Condelezza Rice stated,

"there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq"

Citing state officials in support of state policy (in this case Rice and Tellis) demonstrates precisely nothing.

"Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty"

i.e. a NNWS as defined under the NPT is obligated to accept safeguards at all facilities.

A NWS is not, nor is a non signatory state.

The IAEA and the states that actually export nuclear material have a quite different interpretation of article III as regards non-NPT members or NWS members from what you suggest.

Which is why the NSG was forced to amend its rules to require full scope safeguards for non signatories to the NPT.

If article III required full scope safeguards for non NPT members then there would have been no need for new NSG rules on this.

> Condelezza Rice stated,

And she probably eats Iraqi babies for her supper too.

You've still not been able to respond to the substance of her Senate reply... her views on Iraq or Albania are just a distraction...

(a) Supply of nuclear fuel to India does not violate article I of the NPT since all such fuel is under IAEA safeguards and used for civilian electrical power. The argument that this will free up Indian resources for bomb making is not only inaccurate (see Tellis) but implies that selling solar or wind power equipment to India also violates the NPT since that also frees up generating capacity.

(b) Supply of fuel does not violate article III of the NPT because India is not a "state party" to the NPT. It never signed the treaty. Only non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT are obligated to accept safeguards at all their facilities. Nuclear weapon states are not obliged to accept safeguards at all. Non state parties are obliged to accept safeguards at the particular facility being supplied.

India has the Uranium resources for both a small civil power industry and weapons. It does not have the Uranium required for a massive nuclear power generating sector whether or not it builds weapons.

Indian electrical generating capacity is going to increase irregardless.. it will burn millions of tons of imported coal, its own massive coal reserves (high sulphur) or a few thousand tons of imported Uranium.

Which option has the lowest CO2 emissions ?

You seem to fail to appreciate a simple point. What the above states is that states party to the NPT can export nuke materials to NNWS that accept the safeguards mandated by the Article. India is a nuclear weapon state outside of the NPT. So, it would be entirely consistent then for you for Australia to export nuke materials to India because of a tendentious semantic point that non nuclear weapon state applies only to states party to the treaty. But the treaty actually specifies what are the "nuclear weapon states" so any state that is not a nuclear weapon state, regardless of adherence, is a non nuclear weapon state. Nobody can act to recognise any state other than the actual mandated NWS as NWS as this deal precisely does.

Exporting materials to a nuclear weapon state outside of the NPT regime is not something an NPT state can do to stay NPT complaint. If so, why all the fuss about changing provisions of the regime?

In so far as "interpretation" of the NPT is concerned I notice that the Reliable Replacement Warhead according to Madame Rice is Article VI complaint which of course it is not. But the actions of which country saw a shift in the trigger list from Zangger to NSG exactly?

Err...
India.

CO2 etc is another issue entirely. The best solution for CO2 is a global regime to reduce CO2 emissions and shift toward alternative sources of energy...it is not necessary to destroy the NPT regime, vital for security and survival, to reduce CO2 as you would have it.

In so far as Rice and Tellis are concerned I have better things to do than spend my time on detailed replies for a cheerleader who, in citing state officials, shows nothing more than a propensity to google and cut and paste...think for yourself mate.

In so far as "freeing up" goes we have this on India's fast breeder reactor programme from the Arms Control Association, like people that think rather than cheer lead, http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2007/20070803_IndiaUS.asp

Article 6 of the agreement also states that: "Any special fissionable material that may be separated may only be utilized in national facilities under IAEA safeguards." However, India has thus far refused to agree to place any part of its breeder reactor program -- the ostensible user of such reprocessed material -- under international safeguards. The Congress should demand a Presidential assurance that any plutonium or uranium recovered from reprocessed U.S.-origin fuel be subject to IAEA safeguards in perpetuity, including any such material used in or produced through the use of such material in India’s breeder reactors.

Why don't you two just swap email addresses and carry on this discussion in private