This is a logical extension of the aggregation of all media ownership into the hands of a few mega wealthy individuals whose aim is to preserve the status quo. At the beginning of last century in the USA there were hundreds, if not thousands of totally independent newspapers giving readers a balanced set of opinions and facts. Today they have been reduced to a handful of self-censoring outlets peddling mainstream current political opinion. The identical thing has occurred in Australia. Hundreds of independent newspapers have been reduced to three right-wing, conservative publications - Fairfax, Murdock and PBL [and Fairfax might soon be gone.]
Having gained total control of Newspapers and TV, the internet is the next logical step for the globalists to take to prevent the spread of information.

ybgirp, I couldn't agree more with your comment, except that your position on the left-right political spectrum must be extremely far to the left for you to consider Fairfax as being right-wing and conservative. From my position on the spectrum, Fairfax looks extremely left-wing and not conservative.

Yeah, Fairfax isn't quite the same as the other media empires - no centralised ownership for starters, as well as a distinctly separate political flavour.

As for this article...

Hmm. Kind of stupid to cede this to the air force, reeks of old world thinking. I would have thought intelligence agencies would be more appropriate.

Internet warfare wouldn't be anything like conventional warfare, as this is a flow of information. On the most brutally simplistic terms, any area of internet use could be blacked out with an EMP and no doubt thanks to satellite technology that kind of strike is easier.

Presumably as the internet spreads it's tentacles outward, we'll actually see fewer critical assets accessible online. Utilities such as power, water etc would be kept with separate digital access so they can't be misused by savvy internet operators.

With critical assets offline I don't see how the internet will be a whole lot more than a communication tool (in the context of actual combat) so the real skills will be tracking and identifying individuals and information, and also the use of misinformation.

TurnRightThen Left

I agree that CIVILIAN intelligence agencies are bettor suited to the domestic security role including interception and datamining. I think the interception role and computer hardware have grown under defence umbrellas (eg NSA and DSD in Australia) partially because the cost and precise nature of their activities can be better shielded from public (and enemy) view.

The NSA and USAF Intelligence actually have positive reasons to keep the enemy's (including "terrorists") internet and broader communications going during some phases of War on Terror to:
- monitor enemy intentions, reactions
- most critically when might a rogue state (or even Hezbollah) launch a large missile or
- when might an al Qaeda type body launch another 9/11 scale attack?

I think a problem is should a USAF Cyber Command try to reinvent the wheel and increasingly militarise the War on Terror which is usually means comes down to smaller scale domestic security.

I don't know whether the critical assets you mention can safely go offline (hackers and agencies can find a way) but I think we can agree that uniformed interception agencies and a military ethos are no way to handle the biggest terrorism problem, which is probably homegrown.

Precursor to Cyberspace Command already at PINE GAP?
Here's an update to the article (written 3 weeks ago):

The Air Force Cyberspace Command (AFCC) was announced by the Secretary of the Air Force on November 2, 2006.

This new command will be drawn from the 67th Network Warfare Wing as well as other resources of the Eighth Air Force working out of Louisiana's Barksdale Air Force Base.

"The 67th Network Warfare Wing is charged with executing Air Intelligence Agency's global mission of information operations. As the [US] Air Force's largest operational wing and only intelligence wing, it has people or equipment on every continent except Antarctica. The wing is composed of five intelligence groups, 35 squadrons and detachments and more than 8,000 people serving at some 100 locations around the world to provide information to today's leaders to help shape global events." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/67th_Network_Warfare_Wing

Within the Pacific (and almost certainly including Pine Gap) Cyberspace Command will be responsible for signals interception and early warning intelligence work - an integral part of the Missile Defence "Star Wars" Program. 67th Network Warfare Wing personnel are almost certainly at Pine Gap already along with NSA types. Meanwhile units of USAF Space Command at Pine Gap control spy satellites watching for any hostile missile launches and many other items of interest.

Pine Gap consists of ground stations and satellites capable of intercepting "sucking up" information from most areas on the planet. This information is usually hard to obtain in a timely way, or commercially encypted or encrypted by surrounding governments. For the US Government to make use of such information most of it would be forwarded from the Gap to NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, USA, for decryption.

I'd argue that the Missile Defence aspect of the future Cyberspace Command is good for Australia's defence. What do you reckon?

The whole issue of pine gap is a contentious one, or at least, if we knew more about it, it should be.

Yes, I suppose on the face of it, it is good for our defence insofar as the US isn't going to allow it's closest ally in the southern hemisphere to be compromised, especially seeing as they are relying on their facilities here for information.

That being said... I can't help but wonder if their presence here compromises our own ability to make decisions solely in the Australian interest.

I haven't considered all the angles, overall I can't see too much problem from a strategic standpoint - our having pine gap here is a favour to the US, and as such it doesn't make us indebted to them, quite the opposite, though regardless of how many favours we do, ultimately, if it comes down to a decision that will benefit the US at the expense of Australia, the US will always put themselves first. It's only natural.

In straightforward military terms, this kind of clash is unlikely to happen. In economic terms however, if Australia opted for something along the lines of state ownership of resources such as uranium, we may have a problem. Once again, notlikely to happen any time soon, but as resources become a more crucial issue, particularly energy resources, Australia may find itself in a precarious position due to the fact that we have so much, with so few people.

TurnRightThenLeft,

I appreciate your comments.

Yes certainly if ALL the likely US activities at Pine Gap were known it would be a more contentious piece of infrastructure. Freely available information about NSA activities in the US regarding American citizens (legally contentious) give an indication what the NSA may be capable of regarding Australian citizens (legal under US law). Its is very likely part of the NSA’s job.

I agree Pine Gap is an asset in our alliance with the US. One role is that its part of the spy satellite network that can track North Korea’s emergence into the nuclear club.

I also agree that the US “presence here compromises our own ability to make decisions solely in the Australian interest”. However if some countries assume we are an isolated country with more than our “fair share” of energy resources (uranium, coal, gas) the people paying for them may consider the option of taking them by force some time.

I think duplicating US protection would involve Australia developing or buying nuclear weapons and adopting a defence expenditure on the scale of Israel (officially 9% but probably more like 15% counting subsidized weapons industries and its almost admitted nuclear weapons arsenal).

Just agreeing with the yanks as a flex action appears to be politically easy. As you say the US will ultimately follow its national interests. If China pressed resource demands on Australia the US might have to choose.

What do you think we should do about military self-reliance?

Pete
http://spyingbadthings.blogspot.com/

The problem of capturing data from cyber-space is too much data, i.e, too chit-chat, like on this Forum, using keywords.

For installations like Pine Gap to work, the intelligence process needs to complemented by on the ground surveillance and mico-management, like in Singapore.

Artificial Intelligence based software parsing messages is only good, if the coder-decoder can't circumvent the system: And cirumvention should be easily achieved. Cost benefit would be low unless the process signalling a "red" light is concentrated on preassigned targets.

What is going on behind clsed doors is always hard to determine. Scientists (e.g., Fermi) trying to establish pattents for nuclear fission in the 1930s were obstructed into WII. When the US did in fact enter WWII, the government took sovereign control of all inventions. Scientists leaving Los Alamos were made to declare that had intevented nothing and nothing invented at Los Almos dependent upon pre-WW II inventions. The point is in the public domain we really have to see through smoke and mirrors, en to this day, on matters, such as Pine Gap and cyber monitors.

Where there is surveillance there will be counter-surveillance, if we are being spied on by electronic means. The actions of the (US?) spies are likely to be in check. In several areas of electronics Australia's capicities exceeds the US (known) abilities; e.g., radars and underwater warfare.

Last point, word-of-mouth transfer of messages has always been the best means to communicate truly top secret information.

Oliver

The picture you paint, and issues you highlight look basically correct to me.

Interception and sorting agencies, like the NSA, use vast computer networks to tap into large parts of the world’s telephone/internet system.

Re “ pre-assigned targets “ - algorithms are part of the computer programs essential for deciding what messages should be retained or discarded. Further sorting may only throw up a few messages/conversations from a whole city’s worth of traffic. If the messages are in a foreign language the NSA/US military intelligence has 1,000s of specialists to translate them.

I assume this process is highly secret here in Australia but academics and journalists in the US discuss material like this constantly (eg http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060125_comm_surveillance.pdf ). However, unlike the CIA which clears books “exposes” every few weeks before publication, the NSA does not semi officially endorse anything.

On “surveillance [and] counter-surveillance] I wish I was as confident as you. I imagine our own computers are designed and made in the USA (where else!). This carries with it ongoing vulnerabilities to software and hardware penetration. You may be right about radars and underwater warfare but I think US decryption capabilities would exceed our encryption abilities – consequently I’d say they can read any of our communications.

But not to worry, we’re buddies.

“Last point, word-of-mouth transfer of messages has always been the best means to communicate truly top secret information. “

That’s usually true. I won’t even speculate on exceptions.

I hope this little discussion, wholly based on open source research, is being read by those who believe their in the know.

Pete

plantagenet,

Thank you for your comments and reply.

I once worked for two years with IBM (Washington)on Artificial Intelligence [Bank Software]. Herein, I have a few insights on encyptions.

While technology transfer between Oz and the US was two way on the project, the bottom line is we, in Oz, are behind these guys. Hence, in the case of JV partners, a deeper sofware shell could exist for the technologically more developed. Or it could be in plan sight, but disguised, like Goldfinger's painted car with its gold chassis, used to smuggle gold.

We are used to thinking of bytes being made-up of characters of eight bits (e.g., ASCII). Nonetheless, other bit configurations are possible, and are occasionally used, even commercially.

Avoiding detection would not be hard for a sovereign government: Configure a special twelve bit protocol "scrambled" across two, "within and across", eight bit characters, using the base eight, on a MVS/XA system, which uses base 16. Gold under the paint!

Then, use a (part)decryption key, which is known only the decoder, which changes according to date and/or is add to the original message [Banks use this system with telegraphic funds transfer], before decryption can take place.

The sender's and receiver's decryption keys are combined, only then is the decryption known to be valid [not dysinfo.]. The previous process would be near impossible to break: Because, we don't have both keys, we don't know the systems configurations, we don't know the base. There might be septillion (or a big number) of combinations, even before one can isolate one message, which is, of course, in code.

[I did have a para. on how a less well funded party could subvert a sophisticated system, but decided to delete it, for obvious reasons.]

Point is, one could monitor individuals or groups or levels of traffic. Government sponsored activities would prove much harder. I think John could talk to Tony, with George listening and "understanding". Less well resourced parties, The People, would find it harder to achieve privacy.

I suspect one could encrypt phone lines but domestic phone taps would be comprised, and it would need to be decoded domestically, before international calls could be made, producing a soft spot.

Yes, we are buddies. ABCA countries, whom work under the auspices of materiel uniformity and engagement standardisation and common codes [avoid friendly fire]; supposedly don't spy on each other. Just the same, methinks, no ABCA country can assume perfect compliance of the other, and, some level of covert monitoring exists, even among buddies. Roughly analogous to the prisoner's dillema. We work in our own interest, because we don't "fully" trust the other pary(ies).

Oliver

Thanks for that. Its a clearer explanation of the difficulties of decrypting large organisation/government agency traffic than I've seen before.

One unproveable concern I have is that the NSA has the ability to intercept key messages when they are not encrypted, that is BEFORE our Government encrypts the messages and AFTER they are decrypted. This gets around the decryption obstacle that you refer to. Not going to go into the ways or countermeasures though.

While I suspect the US is ahead in this area other countries: Russia, China, Japan, France and the UK also have the experience, technology and motivation (most commonly to gain commercial information).

These countries all have their listening posts around the world but in places less well known than Pine Gap is to us.

I think the ability to tap into the international phone/internet system is probably of even greater value than traditional wireless listening posts like Pine Gap. For example calls between Canberra and Sydney may actually be routed (in whole or part) through LA, Tokyo or Hong Kong - wherever digital capacity is available and cheap at a given moment.

The whole interception concept is all pretty mind bending stuff but an interesting area to explore. With information openly available on the internet.

No longer do people (like Desmond Ball) need to go over to Washington and search through US hard copy to get a handle on things.

Pete
http://spyingbadthings.blogspot.com/

Guys & Gals,

All this spook talk is unnecessary.

There are many public domain encryption algorithms that are uncrackable - but that is also a matter of public record. (Try this - a ZNA through an 8th order convolution for starters!)

As for USA coming to our defence? Mmmmmm .. my grandfather doesn't remember any incidence of that !

Pete: Desmond Ball? I recall his high profile [a frequent contributor to PDR], when writing a paper for Jim Killen 20+ years ago. To do with continental defence economics & defence offsets, not secret codes.

In the realm of unencrypted messages, traffic-levels can be monitored; to create alerts and without really knowing what is happening. [another deletion]

Visited your site.

Iluvatar: Agree with you, commercial encryption can be very sophisticated. No secret. :-)

Oliver

"Pete: Desmond Ball? I recall his high profile [a frequent contributor to PDR], when writing a paper for Jim Killen 20+ years ago. To do with continental defence economics & defence offsets, not secret codes."

I suggest you read Desmond's biodata at http://rspas.anu.edu.au/people/personal/balld_sdsc.php

His collected works include:

- A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia, Sydney, 1980. [all about Pine Gap etc]

- A Base for Debate: The US Satellite Station at Nurrungar [sigint station], Allen & Unwin, Sydney, London and Boston, 1987.

- Pine Gap: Australia and the US Geostationary Signals Intelligence Satellite Program, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988.

- Signals Intelligence in the Post-Cold War Era: Developments in the Asia-Pacific Region, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1993.

- Burma's Military Secrets: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) from the Second World War to Civil War and Cyber Warfare, White Lotus Press, Bangkok, 1998; and

- (with David Horner) Breaking the Codes: The KGB's Network in Australia, 1944-1950, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998.

I rest my case on Des's knowledge of sigint of which codes are part :)

I think you were referring to signals traffic analysis (before you were deleted). Examples of such analysis are in pages 3 and 7 of this document http://www.stephenelittle.com/cms03.pdf

Pete