Jardine
So if someone is hungry, he has a right to rob you?

If he is near starving, and there is no alternative, of course he has. Similarly, to use an example from Judith Jarvis Thomson, if I'm caught in a blizzard and copme accross your unoccupied hut, I'm morally entitled to break in, and if necessary burn your furniture in order to keep myself alive.

My breach of your rights has to be commensurate with my need--I'm not entitled to go on burning your furniture for fun. There hssz to be no alternative which is in breech. And if I am subsequently in a position to repay you, I'm obliged to. But if I cannot, I have done nothing wrong.

Peter H., I did not suggest that there is, in general a zero sum game. Why did you interpret my remark that way? As for the right to own you body, I recall a discussion some time ago, in which I argued that there were two fallacies in that argument. Was that with you? And if so, have you found a way to fix the problems?

ozbib
No, it wasn't with me. What are the two fallacies?

And what do you say to what I say are the fallacies in arguing against it? If you don't have the exclusive right to the use of your body, then by what right do you participate in the argument? And by arguing don't you implicitly acknowledge the possibilty of a rational discourse, ie not might-is-right, ie based on the right of the other person to the use and control of his body and mind, otherwise what's the point in arguing with him?

Also could you please answer why you said rights are not arbitrary.

“If he is near starving, and there is no alternative, of course he has.”

And what if the reason he’s near starving is because earlier he preferred leisure to work?

Who decides?

“Similarly, to use an example from Judith Jarvis Thomson, if I'm caught in a blizzard and copme accross your unoccupied hut, I'm morally entitled to break in, and if necessary burn your furniture in order to keep myself alive.”

A blizzard of course? But not in a lightish snowfall obviously?

Peter H,

I have just lost half an hor's work replying to you--using a public compuer, where I cannot save my work. I'll have another go, but I am going to runout of time.

I accept that having entered into a discusion with you, and especialy with the way I etered in, that you have a right to my treating ou seriously, and inter alia, explaining why I think human rights talk is not arbitary--at least ot the extent that not every claim will count.

But first to property. You do not presuppose that you own your body when you engage in argument, but that you have rational autonomy. And you cannot (unfortunately) get from there by valid argument to the view that rational autonomy is good, much less that it is the ultimate good or the only good. (RS Peters tried to take that route.)

Nevertheless, I support the view that what counts most is persons, and that what makes the moral difference between persons and at least most animals is rational autonomy. Because I put this forth as the foundation of morality, I cannot prove it. But I can make it plausible, by noting that it rational autonomy brings the possibility of making value judgements and hence of moral action. And I can examine the way the view supports moral views that we take for granted--that murder is wrong, for instance. I compare the view with alternatives, such as utilitarianism, or the official Catholic doctrine of neo-Aristoteleansim. Such views are called moral theories.

A moral theory is used to determine what should be done where we have moral dilemmas. We go from theory to examples and back again. Sometimes a new example, such as the London conjoint twins case in the year 2000, creates problems for a theory. (I'll explain if you are interested.) Then the theory needs to be adjusted. The theory may also throw light on such cases

PeterH continued

There is a risk of circularity; but the argments do not have to be circular--the process is more like a spiral, with (hopefully) greater insight coming as a result.

It is common for people to throw up their hands and declare that we will never resolve the debate between moral theories. But I am more hopeful--though I no longer expect to see it in my lifetime. What I have seen is great improvement in the theories. Examples if you wish.

Now to property. I think that you are your brain, and the relationship betweena brain and its body is not ownership, but that of part to whole. I guess you ust control your body.

I am not even confident that itmakes sense to say that you own your body, in the ordinary sense in which you own your computer, and I don't own this one. But it does make sense to say that someone else owns you--for example, if you are a slave and accept the institution ofof slavery. They could own you, body and mind.

But even if I did have to accept that you own your body and I own mine(in the computer sense) it would not follow that I had an obligation to respect a right to own other property.

I don't know where the argument comes from, but I think it is a shocker. If you like, I'll write about what I think, very tentatively justifies us having an institution of property.

Peter, I am almost out of time; and Jardine, I'm afraid I can't reply till tomorrow.

The main line of argument I want to outline is that it makes sense to think of human rights as the requirements for a person to live a decent life--a life fit for persons. There will be argument about what that involves--can you live a decent life if you have no time for friendship or family relationships? But you would have to be very ingenious to argue convincingly that you have such a right to have or keep a leather jacket (in normal circumstances, of course. Not every thing will do.

I'm afraid I must go--pleawse be patient with me.

Butcould you explain what you mean by resolve?

Thank you.